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Toward a Mission Statement for Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation
Sean J. Griffith* & Dorothy S. Lund**
87 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020)

Abstract
This paper analyzes the conduct of mutual funds in shareholder litigation. We begin by reviewing
the basic forms of shareholder litigation and the benefits such claims might offer mutual fund
investors. We then investigate, though an in-depth docket review, whether and how the ten
largest mutual funds participate in shareholder litigation. We find that although shareholder
suits offer potential benefits, the largest mutual funds have essentially forfeited their use of
litigation. This finding is particularly striking given that index funds and other long-term oriented
mutual funds generally cannot sell their shares when they are dissatisfied with company
performance, leaving them with only two levers in corporate governance—voting and suing.
Mutual funds vote, but they do not sue.
We analyze potential explanations for the failure of mutual funds to litigate on behalf of their
investors. Collective action problems and conflicts of interest raise significant obstacles to
mutual fund participation in shareholder litigation. Yet, we argue, there are situations in which
shareholder litigation could create value for mutual fund investors. We therefore turn to the
normative question: how should mutual funds litigate on behalf of their investors? Answering
this question allows us to articulate a mission statement for mutual funds in shareholder litigation.
Our mission statement is grounded on the perspective of the broadly diversified “market
investor.” The repeat-play incentives and broad diversification of many mutual funds, index
funds in particular, suggests that they could create value by focusing principally on deterrence
objectives. Mutual funds should bring shareholder suits against portfolio companies when doing
so would meaningfully enhance deterrence. They should also scrutinize the litigation brought by
other shareholders, objecting to outcomes that fail to promote meaningful deterrence. At the
same time, mutual funds should focus on compensatory goals in litigation against non-portfolio
defendants because extra-portfolio claims do not raise circularity concerns. In addition, mutual
funds should consider whether litigation can be used to implement corporate governance reforms.
Finally, in all cases, mutual funds should closely monitor litigation agency costs. We close by
suggesting ways in which the incentives of mutual funds might be restructured to bring these
changes about.
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I.

Introduction

Corporate law creates three basic levers for investors to use in influencing the governance
of the companies they own. They can vote.1 They can sell. And they can sue.2 Each of these
remedies serves to align the interests of managers and investors. Because managers would prefer
not to be replaced by a new slate of directors, not to suffer a share price decline from widespread
investor selling, not to have the company sold to a hostile bidder, and not to be sued, they are more
likely to work to maximize investor welfare. That, at least, is the theory.
Reality, however, is considerably more complex. In U.S. public markets, the vast
majority of company shares are held by institutional intermediaries on behalf of investors.
Mutual funds are among the most common institutional owners, holding about one third of the
total U.S. stock market.3 In particular, the “Big Three” fund families—BlackRock, State Street,
and Vanguard—own significant blocks in virtually all publicly traded companies. 4 This gives
them considerable authority over the governance of the companies in which they invest. 5 Yet
many of these funds track the performance of an index, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000, 6
rather than actively trading into and out of companies on the basis of their performance. 7 As a
result, these funds do not have the same set of governance tools. Because they are effectively
long-only, they can access only two levers of corporate governance. They can vote, and they can
sue.

1

Engagement is arguably a fourth pillar of governance, but we view this as a component of voting, as the
effectiveness of the engagement is largely driven by the threat of voting against management.
2
WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
177 (5th ed 2016).
3
SEAN COLLINS ET AL., INV. COMPANY INST., 2018 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 40 (2018),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2018_factbook.pdf (providing data showing U.S. mutual funds held 31% of all U.S. corporate
equities in 2017).
4
See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration Corporate
Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313–14 (2017) (finding that the Big Three own the largest
stakes in at least 40% of all U.S. listed companies and in 88% of the S&P 500); Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New
Corporate
Power
Brokers:
Passive
Investors,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
24,
2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101.
Some
commentators have suggested that the term ought to be the “Big Four” or the “Giant Three.” See, e.g., Lucian
Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 721, 724–25 (“Giant Three”); Leo E. Strine,
Fiduciary Blind Spot: The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’
Savings for Corporate Political Spending, 97 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (“Big Four”). We will continue
to use the “Big Three” terminology to refer to the largest mutual fund blockholders.
5
Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders 1
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-39),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 (“The largest institutional investors have become the
presumptive ‘deciders’ of corporate law controversies.”).
6
Index funds and other passive funds will soon have more assets under management than active funds. See Trevor
Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb 2, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys
-idUSKBN15H1PN. For brevity, we will refer to ETFs, index funds, and other passively managed mutual funds that
seek to track the performance of an index as “index funds.”
7
On institutional investors’ preference for exit (selling) over voice (voting), see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1280 n.8, 1281 (1991) (arguing
that in the absence of a controlling stake institutional investors prefer liquidity to control and therefore fail to monitor).
3
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After a long period of inactivity in corporate governance, large mutual funds have begun to
establish “stewardship” groups to guide their governance activities. 8 The Big Three are
especially vocal in promoting their stewardship practices. BlackRock, for example, advertises
that they “take corporate governance very seriously.” 9 State Street explains that its stewardship
program “is designed to have an impact” and that the fund family “actively engage[s] with …
portfolio companies to promote long-term value of [their] clients’ investments.” 10 And Vanguard
insists that it cares “deeply” about governance and is “good at it.” 11 However, the exclusive focus
of stewardship groups has been on voting.12 Mutual funds tout the number of votes in which they
have participated and, increasingly, highlight their willingness to oppose management. 13 A lively
academic debate has arisen in response to these claims, with scholars also predominantly focused
on voting.14 The potential for mutual funds to exert a governance role through litigation has gone
almost entirely overlooked.15

8

See generally HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO
INVESTMENT
STEWARDSHIP,
MORNINGSTAR
(2017),
https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-Active-Stewardshi
p.pdf (discussing research on how index managers carry out their investment stewardship responsibilities).
9
Madison Marriage, Passive Houses Insist They Do Care About Governance, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/bd77d9b8-dd9f-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6.
10
Asset Stewardship, ST. STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/about-us/asset-stewardship.html (last
visited June 14, 2019).
11
Bill
McNabb,
The
Ultimate
Long-Term
Investors,
VANGAURD
(July
6,
2017),
https://vanguardblog.com/2017/07/06/the-ultimate-long-term-investors/.
12
Again, we are including “engagement”—that is, formal or informal communications between corporate managers
and mutual fund investors—as a species of voting since the ability of mutual funds to be heard in these conversations
ultimately depends upon their voting power.
13
See, e.g., BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT 4 (2018) (noting votes at over 17,000 shareholder
meetings on over 158,000 proposals from July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018); VANGUARD, 2018 INVESTMENT
STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2018) (noting votes at over 19,000 meetings on over 168,000 proposals).
14
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory,
Evidence,
and
Policy,
119
COLUM.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794 (arguing that agency costs at mutual funds inhibit
engaged stewardship); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP.
89, 95–104 (2017) (applying the agency cost problem to mutual fund intermediaries); Luca Enriques & Alessandro
Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective 47–48 (ECGI Working Paper Series
in Law, Working Paper N° 393/2018, 2018) (arguing that network effects may lead to engaged stewardship); Jill E.
Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3192069 (arguing that competition between index and active funds for
new investment creates an incentive for index funds improve corporate governance); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S.
Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1172 (2019) (articulating a set of
standard conflicts that may inhibit mutual funds from acting as loyal stewards); Sean J. Griffith, Opt-in Stewardship:
Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 98 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at
3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3404298 (arguing that mutual fund have incentives and
information to vote intelligently in contests but not in other corporate governance settings); Dorothy S. Lund, The
Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 101, 114 (2018) (arguing that index and passive funds lack
the incentive to vote intelligently); Rock & Kahan, supra note 5, (arguing that spillover effects allow index funds to
act as engage stewards).
15
An exception is Professors Bebchuk and Hirst who observed that mutual funds tend not to serve as lead plaintiffs in
securities class actions. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14 (manuscript at 53–55). We confirm this observation
empirically. See infra Section III. Likewise, Professor David Webber has described how broadly diversified
investors can benefit from using litigation as a form of shareholder activism. See David H. Webber, Private Policing
4
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In this Article, we focus on the third lever of corporate governance—shareholder
litigation—as a tool through which mutual funds might improve the performance of portfolio
companies. Shareholder litigation has long served an important role in policing managerial
misconduct.16 Unfortunately, shareholder suits also have a dark side. Because most shareholder
litigation is representative in nature, the lawyers controlling the litigation often use it to serve their
own interests rather than those of the shareholder beneficiaries, leading to the failure of
shareholder suits to produce meaningful benefits.
As “market investors” —holders of broadly diversified portfolios—mutual funds are in an
ideal position to use litigation to produce benefits for shareholders and to prevent lawyers from
diverting and destroying those benefits. Indeed, litigation may serve stewardship goals more
effectively than voting. First, litigation can produce a direct monetary benefit to shareholders.
Voting, by contrast, produces only indirect monetary benefits, as when an outside
intermediary—an activist or an acquiror—submits a proposal or a bid that has the effect of
increasing shareholder value. Second, shareholder litigation can immediately target and thereby
deter specific bad acts of management. Voting deters mismanagement more bluntly. Proxy
contests are expensive to bring, and misconduct that does not lead to an activist intervention may
be undeterred by voting alone.17 Third, unlike shareholder proposals that result, at best, in a
non-binding commitment to consider forming a committee to study an issue of concern,
shareholder suits produce governance reforms that come with the force of a court order. If the
company does not implement the reforms as promised, they are in violation of the terms of their
settlement, which shareholders can then enforce judicially. Voting, in other words, is no
substitute for litigation. Voting and litigation should instead be viewed as complementary
corporate governance mechanisms, with litigation in many ways the stronger of the two.
We examine mutual fund participation in shareholder suits both theoretically and
empirically. Our analysis begins by reviewing the theoretical grounding of each of the major
forms of shareholder suits: derivative suits, state law direct and class claims, appraisal actions, and
private securities litigation. Mutual funds are empowered to bring each of these suits on behalf of
their investors. Although some large institutional clients may not delegate the right to litigate on
their behalf, most mutual fund investors, including all individual investors, allocate full ownership
rights to the fund by default. This means that mutual funds always have the right to sue on behalf
of at least some of their investors. Moreover, because mutual funds own more or less the entire
market, they could bring litigation in virtually every instance of corporate or managerial
misconduct.
Next, we examine the actual conduct of mutual funds in shareholder litigation. To do so,
we collected data on mutual fund participation in each of the forms of shareholder litigation noted
above over a ten-year time period. We found that the ten largest mutual funds, including each of
of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and
Derivative Actions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 23–27 (2014).
16
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of
Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law, 6 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 164 (2009); C.N.V.
Krishnan, et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248 (2012); Robert B.
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 133, 142–43 (2004).
17
Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. Fin.
Econ. 610, 621 tbl.4, 625 tbl.8, 629 (2013) (reporting that the average proxy contest cost is $10.71 million).
5

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422910

DRAFT

most vocal funds on corporate governance, very rarely participate in shareholder litigation.
Collectively, these funds were involved in the filing of just ten traditional shareholder suits over
our sample period. However, these were often the same claims: the ten suits involved only five
different instances of managerial misconduct. All but one of these complaints alleged violations
of the federal securities laws; we found a single appraisal suit and no instances of state law class or
derivative litigation. The securities claims were typically not brought as class actions, but rather
as individual actions separate from any class claims brought against the same corporate defendant.
Moreover, none of our mutual funds served as lead plaintiff even a single time over our sample
period.
These results are striking standing alone, but for additional perspective, we gather evidence
on the litigation activity of prominent pension funds, hedge funds, and individual shareholder
plaintiffs. Our evidence indicates that these other plaintiffs litigate frequently. Although we do
not claim to know the optimal amount of litigation, the quantitative and qualitative differences
between the litigation pursued by mutual funds and that of other institutional investors raises
serious questions about the ability and incentives of mutual funds to act as faithful governance
intermediaries for their investors.
This is a serious issue. Nearly half of U.S. households invest in mutual funds. 18 In doing
so, they entrust their governance rights to intermediaries. It is critically important that these
intermediaries act to further investor interests when they make litigation decisions. What our
evidence shows is that mutual funds are not discharging this obligation. Indeed, they may not be
thinking about it at all. Why not?
We survey a variety of possible explanations for mutual funds’ failure to participate more
aggressively in shareholder litigation. None is particularly compelling. The failure cannot be
explained by substantive legal barriers or structural obstacles, both of which are limited and
manageable. Nor can the failure be fully explained by the “circularity” problem that arises when
shareholders are on “both sides of the v,” as both plaintiff and defendant. 19 Although mutual
funds own the market and are therefore likely to be on both sides in many suits, they may still
benefit from systemic deterrence and governance benefits won through shareholder suits.
Moreover, not all shareholder recoveries are funded by defendant corporations also owned by
shareholder plaintiffs.
Agency costs and conflicts of interest present serious obstacles. Mutual funds likely do
not want to offend the corporations that funnel them 401(k) and other advisory business by filing
lawsuits against them. Furthermore, because the benefits of shareholder litigation must often be
shared with a class that includes their competitors, mutual funds may see little advantage in
litigating. 20 However, these incentives do not apply to all forms of shareholder litigation.
Corporate defendants in their last period, facing bankruptcy or acquisition, are not a likely source

SEAN COLLINS ET AL., INV. COMPANY INST., supra note 3, at 142 fig.7.1 (showing that 44.5% of U.S. households
owned mutual funds in 2017).
19
See infra notes 108–113.
20
These incentive problems have most often been discussed by others in the context of shareholder voting. See, e.g.,
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14; Lund, supra note 14, at 114–31. Like us, Professor David Webber has raised the
specter of agency costs in the context of litigation. In his study of shareholder derivative suits and class actions filed in
Delaware between 2003 and 2009, he found that mutual funds served as lead plaintiffs only seven times and posits that
agency costs may explain this low number. See Webber, supra note 15 at 16–17, 34.
18

6
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of future advisory business. Moreover, not all shareholder suits lead to pro-rata recoveries.
Mutual funds are typically large enough block-holders to litigate on their own.
It may be that the failure to litigate reveals mutual funds’ motivations in stewardship
generally. Stewardship ought to involve litigation as well as voting, yet mutual funds pursue
stewardship through voting only, perhaps because mutual fund voting is a subject of regulatory
attention while litigation is not.21 But this suggests something about voting too. Take away the
regulatory impetus and mutual funds might neither litigate nor vote.
Mutual fund representatives deny this. In both public statements and private
conversations, they maintain that governance is deeply important to them. Perhaps, then, the
problem is not one of incentives, but of awareness or expertise. We therefore offer an account of
how mutual funds could benefit their investors using “stewardship litigation.” Focusing on the
long-term perspective of the market investor, we argue that mutual funds ought to pursue
extra-portfolio litigation for compensation and intra-portfolio claims for deterrence. They also
ought to consider whether litigation can be used to implement corporate governance reforms. At
the same time, recognizing that litigation often creates more costs than benefits, we argue that
mutual funds can add value by exerting an oversight role over shareholder litigation across the
portfolio and intervening to minimize litigation agency costs. These proposals form the core of
our “mission statement” for mutual funds in shareholder litigation.
Our mission statement would be simple and relatively inexpensive for mutual funds to
implement. The main difference is one of perspective. Engagement with shareholder litigation,
whether in a participating or an oversight role, is an important component of stewardship and
ought to be viewed as such. Insofar as there are agency cost barriers in the way, we suggest ways
in which pressure from investors or regulators may overcome these obstacles.
From this Introduction, the article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the basic theory
underlying shareholder litigation though an examination of prototypical shareholder suits. Part
III contains our empirical study of mutual fund participation in shareholder litigation. As a point of
comparison, it looks at the litigation record of other institutional investors--pension funds and
hedge funds--as well as individual shareholder plaintiffs. Part IV considers various potential
explanations for our findings. Part V provides our normative analysis of how mutual funds
should conceive of their role in shareholder litigation and tackles the question of implementation.
Part VI concludes.
II.

Shareholder Litigation

Before we can assign a role to mutual funds in shareholder litigation, we must first develop
an understanding of what shareholder litigation is for. As noted above, litigation is one of the
traditional levers of corporate governance. But what can shareholders expect to accomplish by
suing the companies they own? And what are typical outcomes of shareholder suits? The
21

Of course, the fact that mutual funds vote their shares does not necessarily mean that they vote them well, and recent
scrutiny of their voting practices has led to some embarrassing revelations. See, e.g., Asjylyn Loder, Funds Don’t
Always Vote for Policies They Publicly Back, WALL STREET J. (April 2, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/funds-dont-always-vote-for-policies-they-publicly-back-11554206401. Not only that,
mutual funds often fail to support their public positions by bringing shareholder proposals themselves. Bebchuk &
Hirst, supra note 14.
7
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answers to these questions will guide the analysis of whether and when mutual funds should
instigate litigation on behalf of their investors. But answering them requires an account of
shareholder litigation generally. This Part offers that account, first reviewing mainstream
theories of shareholder litigation, then evaluating paradigmatic forms of shareholder suits in
practice.
A. Shareholder Litigation in Theory
Shareholder suits do not exist in isolation. Rather, they are part of the broader ecosystem
of corporate law as a whole, in which agency costs are a fundamental concern. 22 By severing
management and control, the corporate form creates incentives for manager-agents to defect from
the interests of their shareholder-principals. 23 These defections range from mild (shirking) to
severe (theft). 24 Corporate governance mechanisms are designed to contain agency costs. 25
Intra-corporate litigation—that is, investors’ suits to enforce their rights as such—can thus be
understood as a basic tool for shareholders to use in seeking to minimize managerial agency
costs.26
Shareholder litigation targets agency costs in three ways. First, the prospect of
shareholder claims may deter managerial misconduct. According to the deterrence rationale, the
risk of personal liability for misconduct may incentivize managers to adhere to shareholders’ best
interests. Even if they are not personally liable, managers may suffer personal consequences
from corporate liability—for example, reduced compensation or diminished career
prospects—that may also effectively deter misconduct. Second, successful shareholder suits may
compensate investors for losses resulting from managerial agency costs. The compensation
rationale for shareholder litigation suggests that such suits are necessary to make investors whole
from severe managerial misconduct, such as theft or fraud. 27 Third and finally, shareholder suits
22

Accord Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 738 (1997)
(describing the core corporate governance problem as “how investors get the managers to give them back their
money”); see also Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1803, 1809 (2008) ( “The key focus of U.S. corporate law and corporate governance systems is what is referred to as
an agency problem: an organizational concern that arises when owners—in a corporation, the shareholders—are not
the managers who are in control.”).
23
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
24
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1662 (2001) (noting that although both shirking and theft can be understood as
agency costs, only theft is illegal due to differences in enforcement costs).
25. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996) (connecting “agency costs” to “opportunism” and
noting that modern firms address the problem through “a governance structure that holders of equity recognize as a
safeguard against expropriation and egregious mismanagement”).
26
In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484–VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17,
2015) (“As a bench judge in a court of equity, much of what I do involves problems of… agency: insuring that those
acting for the benefit of others perform with fidelity, rather than doing what comes naturally to men and
women—pursuing their own interests, sometimes in ways that conflict with the interests of their principals.”). The
other two basic tools available to shareholders, as already noted, are the voting and selling of shares. See supra note
2 and accompanying text.
27
Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison D’Etre of the Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, ERICKSON, GRIFFITH, WEBBER & WINSHIP, EDS.,
(2018).
8
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may result in specific governance reforms designed to reduce agency costs going forward. 28
Shareholder suits may result in the judicial invalidation of a particular governance provision, such
as a poison pill, 29 or they may result in settlements in which the company adopts specific
governance reforms aimed at better aligning the incentives of shareholders and managers. We
will refer to this objective, sometimes described as “corporate therapeutics,” as the “governance
rationale” for shareholder litigation.30
Most shareholder suits are brought in a representative capacity in which a single
shareholder or group of shareholders assert a claim on behalf of a larger class, often all
shareholders as such. 31 This is not because individual shareholders cannot bring their own
claims. Often they can.32 It is simply that individual actions are often inefficient. The costs of
litigating an individual claim may exceed the value of the shareholder’s proportional share of the
recovery. If all shareholders are economically disinclined to sue, there may be less litigation than
all shareholders, on the whole, would prefer. The representative action thus solves a collective
action problem in order to preserve litigation as a constraint on managerial agency costs.
But representative actions come with costs of their own. Representative shareholder suits,
like other forms of representative actions, are typically controlled by a contingency-fee lawyer
serving a quasi-regulatory role with a purely nominal client.33 Such suits invert the ordinary
lawyer-client relationship, with lawyers hiring clients, rather than clients hiring lawyers. 34
Lawyers advertise for clients on investor websites 35 or cultivate client relationships with
institutional investors, often pension funds.36 Having found a client, the lawyers are in control.37
28

See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1749, 1826–29 (2010).
29
See, e.g., Moran v. Household (shareholder suit challenging adoption of poison pill); Unocal (shareholder suit
challenging the application of takeover defenses and setting the standard for such challenges going forward); Revlon
(shareholder suit challenging the use of takeover defenses in the context of an acquisition). More recently,
shareholder suits have challenged the application of defensive tactics to activist interventions. See, e.g., Kallick v.
Sandridge Energy Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 261 (Del. Ch. 2013) (scrutinizing defensive tactics in the context of an activist’s
proxy challenge); Oral Argument on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss & Rulings of the Court, Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret.
Sys. v. Ballantine, 2014 WL 6388645 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty in a board’s use of a
debt covenant as a defense against activism).
30
See George D. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The “Salvage” Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV.
658, 662–63 (1956) (coining the idea of a “therapeutic” settlement).
31
See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, ERICKSON, GRIFFITH,
WEBBER & WINSHIP, EDS., (2018) (compiling recent scholarship on representative shareholder litigation).
32
See infra Section II.B (discussing class fiduciary claims, private securities claims).
33
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 2 (2015) (“[T]he private [class action] attorney is taking on a
public role and acting as a quasi-public servant. . . . [T]his attorney is a private actor, wielding a degree of public
power, but motivated by powerful economic incentives, and yet subject only to limited accountability.”).
34
Id. at 1 (“[I]n group litigation in the United States, the lawyer often appears to be hiring the client, rather than the
client hiring the lawyer.”).
35
Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69 Case Western Reserve L. Rev. ___
(forthcoming 2019).
36
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Securities
Settlements, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 755, 770 (2009) (noting that “large plaintiffs’ law firms continuously monitor the
portfolios of institutional investors, seeking to keep them apprised of potential claim”)
37
Nicholas Politan, U.S.D.C., Dist. of N.J. (Ret.), Mediating Securities Class Actions: A View from the Captain’s
Quarters, Speech at the Institutional Investor Forum (Oct. 20, 2005) in INSTITUTIONAL INV. ADVOC., 2005, at 1, 1
(relating a mediator’s experience in conveying a settlement offer to class counsel: “why don’t you go to the restroom,
look in a mirror, talk to yourself, and come back here and tell me whether you want to accept the settlement or not”).
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Individual investors are rationally indifferent to the conduct of the claim, 38 and institutional
investor plaintiffs appear to be similarly disengaged. 39 These circumstances are ripe for the
now-familiar phenomenon of “litigation agency costs,” in which the attorney’s personal incentives
depart from those of their supposed clients, leading to claims that shareholders would prefer not to
press and resolutions that benefit attorneys at the expense of the shareholders. 40
Mutual fund plaintiffs need not sue in a representative capacity. Mutual funds are the
largest shareholders of most public companies and may prefer, as a result, to litigate in an
individual rather than representative capacity. 41 Even so, mutual funds remain subject to
litigation agency costs. Because litigation is costly, in the form of both the direct costs of
attorneys’ fees and the indirect costs of the time and attention necessary to evaluate and oversee
the litigation effort, prospective mutual fund plaintiffs may prefer to leave it to others, free-riding
on the class-wide benefits they achieve. Litigation agency costs are a relevant consideration any
time mutual funds leave claims to others. Moreover, as market investors, mutual funds are
affected by every representative shareholder suit, whether or not they bring their own claims.
Litigation agency costs therefore affect mutual funds much as they do other investors.
Litigation agency costs limit the ability of shareholders to use litigation to mitigate
managerial agency costs. The question thus becomes how effectively shareholder suits mitigate
managerial agency costs—achieving deterrence, compensation, or governance enhancements—in
the face of litigation agency costs. We now turn to the various forms of shareholders suits with
these questions in mind.
B. Shareholder Litigation in Practice
Shareholder litigation comes in various forms, each with the potential to mitigate
managerial agency costs, and each with the potential to generate litigation agency costs. This
section reviews four basic forms of shareholder suits. The first two, derivative and direct suits,
are different procedural means of enforcing state law fiduciary duties and, as such, are closely
focused on mitigating managerial agency costs. 42 The third, appraisal, is a narrowly
38

ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 389–94 (2nd ed. 1986) (discussing phenomenon where each
shareholder’s stake in the corporation is too small to justify the cost in terms of time and attention of actively engaging
in corporate affairs).
39
Institutional plaintiffs were once proffered as a solution to this problem. See Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman,
Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions,
104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2121–23 (1995) (discussing promise of institutional lead plaintiffs). But this solution seems to
have failed. See infra.
40
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23 (1985) (identifying the problem); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 16, at 135 (arguing that
“just as with derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must balance the positive managerial
agency cost reducing effects of these acquisition-oriented shareholder suits against their litigation agency costs”); see
also Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of Representative Litigation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 152, 154–57 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012)
(summarizing recent empirical work on the scope of the problem of litigation agency costs).
41
See Fichtner et al., supra note 4.
42
Fiduciary duty is essentially connected to agency cost minimization. According to Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel:
The fiduciary principle is an alternative to elaborate promises and extra-monitoring. It replaces
prior supervision with deterrence, much as criminal law uses penalties for bank robbery rather than
10
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circumscribed right under state law invoked solely to increase the price paid in mergers and
acquisitions transactions. The fourth, private securities litigation, is a creature of federal rather
than state law and is aimed broadly at assuring that transactions in corporate shares are not affected
by fraud or misinformation. Our aim is to develop an understanding of the commonalities as well
as the differences between these paradigmatic forms of claims, specifically as they affect the
ability of shareholders to police managerial agency costs though litigation.
1. Derivative Suits
The derivative suit is the oldest form of representative litigation in the corporate law
context.43 In a derivative suit, an individual shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation to seek
redress for some harm done to the corporation itself.44 The shareholder alleges that the board is
compelled by fiduciary duty to seek redress for the harm, often caused a form of managerial
misfeasance or malfeasance.45 Because the derivative suit is filed on behalf of the corporation,
there are several opportunities for the corporation to regain control of the claim. 46 Provided the
corporation does not retake control, however, the shareholder may press the claim on behalf of the

pat-down searches of everyone entering banks. . . . Such rules preserve the gains resulting from the
separation of management from risk bearing while limiting the ability of managers to give priority
to their own interests over those of investors.
Easterbrook & Fischel, T HE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW at 92.
43
Some commentators have suggested that, in addition to being old, it is obsolete. GEOFFREY PARSONS MILLER, THE
LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 365 (2nd ed. 2017) (referring to the derivative suit as a
“platypus”). Nevertheless, derivatives suits are still regularly filed; see Erickson, supra note 28, at 1760 (studying
characteristics of 141 derivative suits filed in the mid-2000s).
44
The defining feature of the derivative suit is that the underlying harm has been done to the corporation, not the
shareholder directly, and therefore it is the corporation that would receive any recovery. Tooley v. Donaldson,
Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) (stating that the standard “must turn solely on the following
questions: (1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who
would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)”). The
shareholder suit is, in the first instance, a request that the corporation seek redress itself. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The nature of the action is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to
compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against
those liable to it.”).
45
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (“[T]he purpose of the derivative action [is] to place in
the hands of the individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the corporation from the misfeasance and
malfeasance of ‘faithless directors and mangers”’ (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949))); accord Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473, 475 (Del. Ch. 1951) (“[W]henever a corporation
possesses a cause of action which it . . . refuses to assert . . . equity will permit a stockholder to sue in his own name for
the benefit of the corporation solely for the purpose of preventing injustice when it is apparent that the corporation’s
rights would not be protected otherwise.”).
46
These include, for example, the demand requirement and the formation of special litigation committees. D EL. CT.
CH. R. 23.1(a) (requiring that the plaintiff “allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain
the action the plaintiff desires from the directors . . . and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for
not making the effort”); see Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An Empirical
Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1320 tbl.1 (2009) (studying the current operation of special litigation committees and
finding that committees pursue claims ten percent of the time, settle thirty percent of the time, and seek dismissal sixty
percent of the time).
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corporation to a resolution, in which case any monetary recovery is paid into the corporation, not
directly to the shareholder.47
Derivative suits rarely result in monetary recoveries. Empirical studies of derivative suits
have consistently found that monetary recoveries in derivative suits are rare. 48 But rare does not
mean never, and meaningful financial recoveries do occur—including, for example, a $139
million settlement in 2013 involving News Corp., a $275 million settlement in 2014 involving
Activision Blizzard, and a $137.5 million settlement in 2015 involving Freeport-McMoran. 49
Payments made by individual directors and officers to resolve derivative suits cannot be
indemnified by the corporation.50 They can, however, be insured and are typically covered under
the corporation’s D&O policy.51 Insured recoveries will not have a direct deterrent effect on
managerial misconduct.52
Governance reforms are a much more likely outcome of derivative litigation than monetary
relief. Empirical studies suggest that derivative suits are more than two times more likely to settle
for non-pecuniary relief than they are to settle for money. 53 These reforms are qualitative and
therefore difficult to assess empirically, but the authors of the leading studies have expressed
skepticism, noting that such reforms are typically “inconsequential” or “cosmetic,” 54 frequently
amounting to the rote application of a common set of governance reforms—such as increased
board independence or attendance requirements at board meetings—often without any clear
connection to the alleged problems that led to the litigation.55 This is not a uniform conclusion,
47

Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
75, 81 (2008) (citations omitted) (“In a derivative suit, the corporation is the functional plaintiff—the real party in
interest . . . . Any recovery in a derivative suit is returned to the corporation. As a result, shareholders . . . do not
receive any direct financial benefit.”).
48
See, e.g., Frank Wood, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944) (finding
monetary recoveries in 46 of 573 public company derivative suits filed in New York state and federal courts between
1932 and 1942 and finding typical settlements amounted to less than 3 percent of damages alleged in the underlying
complaint); Erickson, supra note 28, at 1799 (finding that 13 of 141 derivative suits sampled from the mid-2000s
resulted in a monetary payment); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, (1991) (finding that only 12 out of 128 derivative suits in a sample period from the 1960s through
the mid-1980s ended in monetary recovery).
49
See Jessica Erickson, The (Un)changing Derivative Suit, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 58, 65 (citing Tom Hals, Judge Oks Activision $275 Mln Shareholder
Settlement,
$72
Mln
for
Lawyers,
REUTERS
(May
20,
2015,
4:51
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/activision-settlement/judge-oks-activision-275-mln-shareholder-settlement-72-mln-f
or-lawyers-idUSL1N0YB2SA20150520; Jonathan Stempel, Update 2-Freeport-McMoRan in $137.5 Mln Settlement
over
Purchases,
REUTERS
(Jan.
15,
2015,
9:16
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/freeportmcmoran-settlement/update-2-freeport-mcmoran-in-137-5-mln-settlement-o
ver-purchases-idUSL1N0UU1FU20150115).
50
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b) (2019).
51
Id. § 145(g). See also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010) (noting that although corporate payments made in
connection with derivative suits may generally not be indemnified, they are typically covered under “Side A” of a
D&O insurance policy).
52
Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5
(2006).
53
See Erickson, supra note 28, at (finding that 34 of 141 suits studied settled for non-pecuniary relief); Romano, supra
note 48, at (finding that non-pecuniary relief two times more often than monetary relief).
54
Romano, supra note 48, at.
55
Erickson, supra note 28, at 1808.
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however. In a study of derivative suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000,
Thomas and Thompson found that although the claims often resulted in non-monetary relief, the
settlements nevertheless returned “very real gains” to the corporations. 56 As a recent example,
consider the derivative litigation filed against Twenty-First Century Fox in the wake of the
decades-long patterns of sexual misconduct involving former CEO Roger Ailes as well as news
anchor Bill O’Reilly. Rather than contesting the plaintiffs’ claims, Twenty-First Century Fox
promptly entered into a settlement in which it agreed to dedicate $90 million to improving
corporate governance at the company and also establish a “Workplace Professionalism and
Inclusion Council” tasked with strengthening sexual harassment reporting and training, and
helping to recruit and promote the advancement of women and minorities at the company. 57 The
derivative suit also proved uniquely well-suited to addressing the problem of stock-option
backdating in the mid-2000s, when companies manipulated the date of the option grant to their
executives in order to increase their value. 58 The derivative suits that followed in the wake of this
scandal frequently resulted in the repricing of these options to benefit the corporation. 59
Nevertheless, in many cases the governance reforms and other benefits that seem to be won
by derivative suit plaintiffs may in fact won by prosecutors, regulators, or other claimants. This is
because derivative suits are frequently brought in the wake of other actions, a phenomenon known
as the “tag-along” derivative suit.60 For example, nearly half of all securities class actions filed
between 2005 and 2008 were accompanied by a tag-along derivative suit, 61 and government
investigations of corporate compliance failures are also frequently followed by derivative
litigation.62 Why do derivative plaintiffs bother filing claims when a prosecutor, regulator, or
class action claimant (sometimes all three) has already targeted the same underlying misconduct?
It is not because their results are better. They are worse. 63 It is more likely because the
representative nature of the derivative suit enables another attorney to extract a fee. 64
56

Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1747, 1778–79 (2004).
57
See Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1622
(2018) (citing Exhibit A to Stipulation & Agreement of Settlement, Compromise, & Release at 3, 10–11, City of
Monroe Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Murdoch, No. 2017-0833-AGB (Del. Ch. filed Nov. 20, 2017)).
58
Ross D. Fuerman, Securities Class Actions Compared to Derivative Lawsuits: Evidence from the Stock Option
Backdating Litigation on Their Relative Disciplining of Fraudster Executives, 8 J. FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT.
198, 204–07 (2016) (comparing the results of derivative suits to the results of class actions in responding to the option
backdating crisis).
59
Erickson, supra note 28, at 1802–03 (finding that 40 percent of stock option suits resulted in a financial benefit,
compared to 2 percent of non-stock option suits).
60
Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, (2011) (finding
that over 95% of derivative suits sampled were accompanied by at least one parallel lawsuit or government
investigation and that over 80% were accompanied by two or more parallel lawsuits or government investigations with
a median of four different types of litigation arising out of the same underlying event).
61
Stephen J. Choi et al., Piling On? An Empirical Study of Parallel Derivative Suits, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
653, (2017).
62
See, e.g., In re Wal-mart Stores, Inc. Del. Derivative Litig., 167 A.3d 513, 513–14 (discussing derivative suit
following in wake of FCPA investigation of Wal-Mart which has already resulted in substantial reform of Wal-Mart’s
corporate compliance program). See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder
Litigation Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (2012) (examining recent
shareholder litigation based on company behavior that violates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
63
Choi, et al., supra note 61 (finding that attorneys who frequently file parallel suits are more likely to obtain lower
monetary recoveries for their clients and are more likely to settle for non-pecuniary relief); Erickson, supra note 60;
13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422910

DRAFT

In sum, although they may provide compensatory relief to the corporation and thereby its
shareholders for an agent’s misfeasance or malfeasance, derivative suits rarely result in monetary
recoveries. Moreover, because they are insurable, when monetary recoveries do occur, they are
unlikely to deter corporate managers. Derivative suits do often produce governance reforms,
which may positively benefit the corporation. However, the indicia of litigation agency costs are
high, suggesting that the real goal of the governance reforms may be to justify the payment of
attorneys’ fees.
2. State Law Direct and Class Claims
Like derivative suits, state law direct claims invoke fiduciary duty to allege managerial
malfeasance, but in the case of direct claims, the harm falls directly upon the shareholder, and is
not derivative of a primary injury to the corporation. 65 Claims involving shareholder voting
rights or acquisitions, in which shares will be cancelled or merged, are paradigmatically direct. 66
Direct claims, especially those involving mergers and acquisitions, are frequently brought on a
representative basis, as class actions.67
Also like derivative suits, shareholder class actions can achieve compensatory, deterrence,
or governance objectives. Most merger claims plead a sufficient basis for both monetary and
non-monetary relief.68 Nevertheless, the vast majority of such cases are settled for non-pecuniary
relief, specifically supplemental disclosures, providing no demonstrable benefit for shareholders. 69
More recently, the pattern has been to end such suits not through settlement, but through the
payment of a “mootness fee.”70 In this situation, the defendant issues corrective disclosures,
Erickson, supra note 49, at 63 (“[I]n the hierarchy of corporate lawsuits, shareholder derivative suits may well be at
the bottom.”); Westbrook, supra note 62, at 1228–29.
64
Even in the absence of a settlement, lawyers may be able to claim that their litigation effort created a “corporate
benefit” thereby entitling them to a fee paid by the corporation. Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How
to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2015); accord Erickson, supra
note 49, at 64 (“The empirical evidence suggests that attorneys are often using derivative suits not to uncover new
types of misconduct or to advance new theories of liability, but rather to obtain a share of the attorneys’ fees.”).
65
See supra note 44 and accompanying text (distinguishing derivative and direct suits).
66
Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1277 (Del. 2007) (holding shareholders' claim to be direct “because the
Recapitalization constituted an expropriation of voting power and economic value from [the Company's] public
stockholders, and a transfer of that voting power and economic value to [the defendants]”).
67
See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 16, at 153 (identifying frequent filings and low value settlements as key
indicia of litigation agency costs).
68
Merger class actions typically allege that process defects have led to an inadequate deal price, thus creating a basis
for damages. Most merger claims also allege defects of disclosure that can be remedied by non-pecuniary relief in the
form of corrective disclosures. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 572 (2015).
69
Id. at 559 (citing ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING
MERGERS
AND
ACQUISITIONS
6
fig.7
(2013),
http://cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Mergers-and-Acqui
[http://perma.cc/TRL8-QNTK?type=pdf]; Ann Woolner et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for
Investors,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
16,
2012,
10:59
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/lawyers-cash-in-while-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merge
r-lawsuit-deals [http://perma.cc/32HY-A22M]) (“[Deal litigation] lawsuits rarely result in a monetary recovery for the
plaintiff class. Rather, the vast majority end in settlement or dismissal. In most settled cases, the only relief
provided . . . consists of supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement.”)
70
Griffith, Innovation, supra note 35.
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thereby mooting the claim and entitling the defendant to dismissal, but at the same time entitling
the plaintiffs to a fee under the corporate benefit doctrine. 71 The amount of the fee can be
adjudicated, but it is more frequently agreed between plaintiff and defendant. 72 The virtue of this
procedure, from the plaintiffs’ perspective, is that it allows the litigants to avoid recent rulings, in
Delaware and other jurisdictions, hostile to disclosure settlements. 73 Because the mootness fee is
not a class settlement and is not therefore binding upon absent members of the class, it need not be
presented in a fairness hearing.74 Mootness dismissals thus bypass judicial review, making it
easier for the lawyers to get paid.75
As this discussion suggests, merger class actions exhibit a high degree of litigation agency
costs. They are filed automatically in the wake of most deals.76 They overwhelmingly result in
non-pecuniary relief, typically supplemental disclosures. The relief is of no apparent value to
shareholders.77 Yet the attorneys are paid, either for disclosure settlements or mootness fees. 78
71

As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court:
Under the “mootness” exception, a court may award attorneys’ fees where the fee applicant demonstrates
that: (1) the litigation was meritorious when filed, (2) the action rendering the litigation moot produced the
same or a similar benefit sought by the litigation, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the
litigation and the action taken producing the benefit.
Dover Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (2006) (accepting the further
characterization of “the mootness doctrine [as] an extension of the corporate benefit exception”).
72
The mootness award was cited by the Court of Chancery as the “preferred method” for resolving disclosure-based
claims because of the potential for adversarial fee litigation to enable the court to value the benefit on an informed
basis. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897–98 (Del. Ch. 2016) (referring to mootness
dismissals as the “preferred scenario” and noting that “[i]n the mootness fee scenario, the parties also have the option
to resolve the fee application privately without obtaining Court approval”). Parties have tended to settle fee disputes
in order to avoid additional adversarial process. Matthew D. Cain et. al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71
VAND. L. REV. 603, 627 tbl.5 (2018) (finding sharply increasing rates of mootness settlements).
73
The leading case is Trulia 129 A.3d at 898 (“[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be
met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass
nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that
such claims have been investigated sufficiently.”). Cases in other jurisdictions following Trulia include: In re
Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation, 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016); Bushansky v. Alliance Fiber Optics Products,
Inc., No. 1-16-CV-294245, (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017) (adopting Trulia standard into California law); Griffith v.
Quality Distribution, Inc., 43 Fla. L. Weekly D 1599, (Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (adopting Trulia standard into Florida
law); see Vergiev v. Aguero et al., No. L-2276-15 6–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016),
https://margravelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2016-06-06-Final-Order-and-Judgment-and-Statement-of-Re
asons.pdf (rejecting settlement and adopting Trulia into New Jersey law).
74
See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 1435 (2006) (arguing that fairness hearings require a combination of adversarial and regulatory approaches).
75
Mootness settlements require, at most, notice to the class. See, e.g., Swomley v. Schlecht, No. 9355–VCL, 2015
WL 1186126, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2015) (setting forth class notice procedure for mootness fee, after defendants
mooted certain disclosure claims and successfully moved to dismiss rest of case); In re Zalicus Inc. Stockholders
Litig., No. 9602–CB, 2015 WL 226109, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 2015) (supporting private mootness fee resolution
procedure while requiring that adequate notice be provided to stockholders); In re Astex Pharms., Inc. Stockholders
Litig., No. 8917-VCL, 2014 WL 4180342, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2014) (same).
76
By 2009, shareholder claims were brought against close to 90% of all third-party mergers, a number that held until
2016. After a brief interlude in the wake of Trulia, the percentage of filings has climbed again. STEFAN BOETTRICH
& SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, at 19 (2019);
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2017 YEAR IN REVIEW, at 2 (2018) (highlighting the
growth in federal class action filings involving mergers and acquisitions post-Trulia).
77
Fisch et al., supra note 68, at 600–01.
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Again, we are not claiming that merger litigation never achieves meaningful relief for
shareholders. There are examples of cases in which merger class actions have resulted in
substantial monetary recoveries.79 And there are other cases in which state law direct claims have
been brought to enjoin defective transaction processes—often involving the preferential treatment
of bidders—the result of which has been to open the process to competitive bidding and thus
higher deal values for target shareholders. 80 Moreover, such cases may have an ex ante deterrent
effect on transaction planners, leading them to structure deals to avoid injunction risk. But the
recent history of such claims more closely resembles a mass of non-meritorious claims of no
apparent value to anyone other than the attorneys involved.
3. Appraisal Claims
Shareholder suits for appraisal have a narrower focus than fiduciary duty claims filed as
direct or derivative suits. As described by the Delaware Supreme Court, in an appraisal suit, “the
only litigable issue is the determination of the value of the appraisal petitioners’ shares on the date
of the merger, the only party defendant is the surviving corporation, and the only relief available is
a judgment against the surviving corporation for the fair value of the dissenters’ shares.” 81
Appraisal suits are also narrow in that not all merger transactions will qualify for the appraisal
remedy. In Delaware, for example, appraisal is available in cash deals, but not in transactions
where target shareholders receive publicly traded equity in exchange for their shares. 82 Appraisal
suits, in other words, serve a narrowly defined compensatory goal—making whole dissenting
shareholders who have received less than fair value in a particular type of transaction.
Appraisal claims are also distinguishable from other forms of shareholder litigation
because they cannot be brought as class or derivative actions. 83 They appear to be
non-representative. On closer inspection, however, this distinction breaks down. 84 Appraisal
actions contain procedures for connecting dissenters and ultimately coordinating their efforts
under a single lead counsel with fiduciary duties to represent the interests of dissenting
shareholders as a class.85 However, unlike class actions, there is no mechanism by which lead
counsel can force all dissenting shareholders into a settlement. Settlements in appraisal actions
78

The average plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee for disclosure settlements had recently been $500,000. Id. For mootness
settlements, the recent range seems to be from $87,500 to $450,000, with an average of $268,750. See Exhibit 1 to
Defendant’s Response to Order at , Einhorn v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., No. 18-0297-RGA, (Del. Dist. Ct. 2018).
79
See generally Joel Eden Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposes The Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements,
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 905–906 (2016) (compiling a list of 15 merger cases resolved between 1998 and 2011 in
which shareholder plaintiffs recovered a common fund for target shareholders in excess of $40 million).
80
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46–47 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284–87 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d
173, 182–83 (Del. 1986).
81
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 (Del. 1988).
82
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2019). The availability of appraisal to specific transactions varies from state to state.
For scholarship debating the purpose underlying various state appraisal statutes, see, for example, Daniel R. Fischel,
The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 875, 875–84; Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore,
The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 434–45 (1985).
83
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 799 (2003)
(citing § 262(a)) (noting that “the Delaware corporate statute does not authorize a class appraisal procedure”).
84
See generally Minor Myers, Appraisal as Representative Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION, supra note 31, at 254 (examining the ways in which appraisal actions may be seen as a
form of representative litigation).
85
Id. at 256–58 (describing procedures for consolidating appraisal actions and compiling cases).
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must be presented to all dissenters, each of whom has the option of participating in the settlement
or intervening to continue the proceeding.86 Also unlike class actions, there is no shifting of
attorneys’ fees to the defendant. 87 Appraisal petitioners pay their own attorneys’ fees and bear
their own litigation costs, apportioning them among dissenters, but generally not shifting them to
the corporation itself.88 This distinction has important implications for the question of litigation
agency costs, suggesting that appraisal actions are likely to be pursued only when the claimants
determine that the benefits of an action exceed its costs, in contrast to class actions and derivative
suits that may be pursued for attorneys’ fees irrespective of the benefit to the putative class. 89
Recent empirical studies support the notion that litigation agency costs are lower in
appraisal actions than they are for class action merger litigation. Korsmo and Myers have found
that while class action merger litigation is strongly associated with non-merit factors, such as deal
size, appraisal claims are related to legally relevant criteria, including abnormally low deal
premiums and insider participation in the transaction.90 Recent work by other researchers has
confirmed these findings.91 Moreover, the availability of appraisal seems to improve rather than
impair the operation of the merger market. Boone, Broughman, and Macias find a correlation
between stronger appraisal rights and higher acquisition premiums, and they find no evidence that
acquirors hold back deal value to deal with the risk of appraisal. 92 The risk of an appraisal
proceeding ex post appears to incentivize transaction planners to implement auction-based

86

Edgerly v. Hechinger, No. 16138-NC, 1998 WL 671241, at *4 (Del. Ch. 1998) (noting that non-settling petitions
must be “given notice . . . and an opportunity to intervene” to continue to press the appraisal proceeding); Raynor v.
LTV Aerospace Corp., 317 A.2d 43, 47 (Del. Ch. 1974) (holding that “dissenting stockholders shall be entitled to
participate equally with the plaintiffs in any settlement of this consolidated appraisal action”).
87
See, e.g., M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 527 (Del. 1999) (quoting Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996)) (stating that appraisal petitioners “‘should bear the burden of paying
[their] own expert witnesses and attorneys,’ unless some equitable exception applies”).
88
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2019). (“Upon application of a stockholder, the Court may order all or a
portion of the expenses incurred by any stockholder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without
limitation, reasonable attorney’s fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to be charged pro rata against the value of
all shares entitled to an appraisal.”)
89
Myers, supra note 84, at 262 (“The fee award [in class actions] is crucial to the operation of the liability system.
By contrast, in appraisal, the stockholder is making a decision to dissent after taking into account the costs of the
proceeding.”)
90
See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1551, 1585, 1603 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage] (citing Charles Korsmo &
Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 874 (2014)
[hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, The Structure of Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?]); Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do Merits Matter?, supra note 90, at 847–48.
91
See Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 727 (2016)
(stating that “petitioners seem to target deals with characteristics that are most likely to be tainted by conflicts of
interest, such as going-private deals, minority squeeze outs, and short-form M&A with low premiums.”); accord
Jonathan Kalodimos & Clark Lundberg, Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions: Are Appraisal Rights Being
Abused?, 22 FIN. RES. LETTERS 53, 54–57 (2017) (confirming that lower premiums are more likely to lead to appraisal
actions).
92
See Audra Boone et al., Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal 3 (Ind. Legal Studies, Working
Research Paper No. 381, 2019) (finding that “Delaware targets receive higher acquisition premiums . . . following
events that strengthen the appraisal remedy”). The authors also find that the bidding of appraisal arbitrageurs
post-announcement effectively eliminates the post-announcement spread, enabling shareholders to obtain the deal
price without having to wait for the transaction to close. Id. at 19.
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transaction structures ex ante, providing a potential benefit to all target shareholders in the form of
a higher merger price.93 These results have also been confirmed by other researchers. 94
In this way, although appraisal actions are designed to accomplish a more narrow
compensatory end than class action merger litigation, they may ultimately have a greater ex ante
effect on the target managers than fiduciary duty lawsuits. If this is so, it is likely because
appraisal actions involve engaged plaintiffs—often specialized hedge funds—who bear their own
litigation costs and therefore have incentives only to pursue claims when the monetary benefit
exceeds the cost of litigation.95 Appraisal claims, in other words, succeed where merger class
actions fail because they contain litigation agency costs.
4. Private Securities Litigation
Finally, shareholders may bring private securities claims. Although they involve a variety
of potential causes of action and a variety of potential defendants, 96 the essential basis of all such
claims is misinformation—fraud, misstatements, or omissions—provided in connection with
transactions in corporate securities. 97 Securities claims based on misinformation may seem
distinct from corporate law claims based on misconduct, but there is an essential link between the
two. When corporate managers engage in misconduct, they typically also conceal it. These
misstatements or omissions thus transform what might otherwise be only a state law derivative or
direct claim into a federal securities claim, making securities claims a catch-all means of targeting
managerial misconduct.98
Private securities litigation can be brought in class action form, and securities class actions
make up fully half of all class actions filed in federal courts. 99 The quintessential securities class
action is the 10b-5 claim, alleging a material misrepresentation (or omission) in connection with

93

Id. at 4 (summarizing their findings as suggesting that “bidders protect themselves against threat of appraisal, not
through contractual terms that would allow the bidder to walk away from the deal . . . but rather by increasing their
upfront bid and improving the price-setting process”).
94
See Scott Callahan et al., Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value, 3 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 147 (2018) (manuscript
at 7).
95
On the role of appraisal arbitrage hedge funds, see Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 90, at 1573
n.85.
96
For example, private securities litigation may be brought under section 11 of the Securities Act for misstatements or
omissions made in a registration statement, under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act for violations of the offering
process, under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act for misstatements and omissions made in the prospectus, and
under section 10 of the Exchange Act for misstatements and omissions made in securities transactions generally.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(a), 77l(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2019); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(2019). Potential defendants include the corporate issuers, responsible officers and directors, accountants, lawyers,
and underwriters. These are statutorily defined under some causes of action. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 77j.
But the same defendants are potentially vulnerable under other causes of action as well, often as aiders and abettors of
the primary violation. See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
97
LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY A. PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION (2018).
98
See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 861 (2003) (arguing that outside of the contexts of self-dealing and acquisitions,
“corporate governance . . . has passed to federal law and in particular to shareholder litigation under Rule 10b-5”).For
a lighter take on the same point, see Matt Levine, “Everything is Securities Fraud.”
99
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD.
811 (2011).
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the purchase or sale of securities.100 Plead as a “fraud on the market” claim, in which any person
trading in the shares of a public company shares prior to the correction of a public misstatement,
10b-5 can reach effectively all forms of corporate misconduct. 101 As a result, securities filings
alleging violations of rule 10b-5 predominate other forms of private securities litigation, typically
at a rate of more than 10:1.102 Furthermore, recoveries in securities class actions vastly exceed
typical recoveries under state fiduciary duty claims. Average securities settlements are in the tens
of millions of dollars. In 2017, for example, the average securities class action settlement was
$25 million, down from $72 million in 2016.103 Fiduciary duty suits, recall, most often result in
no money at all (except for the lawyers).104
Given their ability, properly plead, to reach most forms of corporate misconduct and their
greater potential to result in meaningful monetary recoveries, private securities claims would seem
to promise generally greater potential to control managerial agency costs than state fiduciary duty
claims. Nevertheless, there are considerable indicia of litigation agency costs in securities cases
as well. As in the case of merger class actions, corporate defendants fund the full cost of all
claims that are not dismissed, paying not only the settlement amount but also the plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees. Furthermore, there are strong pressures on both sides to settle, 105 which
securities class action claims typically do, often for “pennies on the dollar”—that is, a few cents in
settlement proceeds for every dollar claimed in investor loss. 106 The fact that recoveries are a

100

Rule 10b-5, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful, among other things, to “make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). A private right of action does not exist in rule or statute but was
judicially created first in 1946 and finally blessed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1971. See Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (quoting Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970)); Kardon
v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing a private right of action under Rule
10b-5).
101
Matt Levine, Everything is Securities Fraud (compiling disparate examples of corporate misconduct plead as
securities fraud class actions). The fraud on the market claim, like the private right of action, is a judicial creation.
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274–77 (2014) (recognizing the fraud on the market
class action as established precedent); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser,
806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3rd Cir. 1986)) (creating the fraud on the market class action).
102
BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 76, at 5; CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 10. The exception to
this claim is the recent proliferation of securities class actions under rule 14a, alleging defective disclosures in
connection with M&A transactions. After years of amounting to no more than a small minority of all securities
claims, merger objection suits increased sharply in 2016 and in 2017 outnumbered even 10b-5 claims. See
BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 76, at (reporting 197 merger objection cases in 2017 compared to 191 10b-5
filings); CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 76, at 14. This is a direct result of the migration of merger objection
suits to federal court in the wake of Delaware’s crack-down on disclosure only settlements. See Sean J. Griffith,
Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t,
in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES, Solomon & Thomas, eds., Univ. of Chicago Press (2019).
103
BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 76, at . These averages are strongly influenced by a small number of very
large settlements. Median settlements were $6 million in 2017 and $9 million in 2016. Id.
104
See supra Parts II.B. 1-2.
105
Amanda M. Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities Law: Insights from Tort Law’s “Reasonable
Person” & Suggested Reforms, 43 J. CORP. L. 77, 81, 85–86, 93–94 (2017) (emphasizing defendants’ incentives to
settle even weak cases given the unpredictability of juries combined with the uncertainty of certain liability elements).
106
See BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 76, at 34.
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small portion of claimed damages is often used to claim that securities class actions do not achieve
their compensatory objectives.107
The more profound objection to the compensation rationale, however, is that given that it is
the corporation that pays, it is the shareholders themselves that fund their own settlements. 108
This “circularity” critique of the compensation rationale operates on two levels simultaneously. 109
Not only will some portion of the class—those who do not sell out of the company entirely—fund
the class recovery in the lawsuit itself,110 but also diversified shareholders—because they as likely
to be buyers as they are to be sellers—will fund the vast majority of such recoveries across their
portfolio over time.111 Shareholders will, in other words, be paying themselves. 112 Were it not
for the amounts they must also pay plaintiffs’ and defense counsel, the result would be more or less
a wash.113 Given those amounts, however, shareholders’ compensatory goals are unlikely to be
well served through class action securities litigation.
But securities litigation may still serve deterrence goals. The securities class action may
have a role to play in forcing managers to internalize the costs of their own misconduct. 114
Managers who fear personal liability, of course, may hesitate to engage in misconduct. However,
in this context it is worth noting that personal liability in private securities litigation is vanishingly
rare.115 Managers are typically indemnified by the corporation for any personal liabilities arising
in connection from securities suits, and corporations are typically insured under a D&O policy not
only for their indemnification obligations to manager-defendants but also for any liabilities arising
from having been named as a co-defendant in the suit.116 As a result, any deterrence effect of
securities class actions depends entirely upon the D&O insurer, and studies show that although
insurers seek to distinguish between good and bad insurance risks, there is not a large marginal

107

Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 371–72
(2007).
108
Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 648–49
(1996); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public
and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1323 (2008).
109
Rose, Raison D’Etre, supra note27, at 39, 47 (explaining that “circularity exists at the micro and marcro level”).
110
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509–10 (1997)
111
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1546–47 & n.42 (2006).
112
The circularity critique is not limited to securities class actions and may apply to state law claims, especially
derivative suits as well. Indeed, concerns about circularity explain why state law forbids corporations from
indemnifying directors and officers for amounts paid to resolve derivative suits. In such a case indemnification
would essentially amount to a payment from the corporation to the manager to pay back an amount paid by the
manager to the corporation. But state law does allow such settlements to be insured, and as a result, corporations fund
their settlements largely through proceeds. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
113
Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 668–69
(1992).
114
The scholarly literature suggests, however, that damages calculations may be miscalibrated for serving this end.
See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1493
(1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611,
643–44 (1985).
115
Black et al., supra note 52.
116
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’
Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1802 (2007) (distinguishing between Side B coverage for corporate
indemnification obligations and Side C coverage for corporate liabilities as a named defendant).
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difference between the premiums paid between well and poorly governed firms. 117 If this is so,
the effect of insurance is to substantially weaken the deterrence potential of securities class
actions.118
III.

Mutual Fund Plaintiffs

Mutual funds, as already noted, hold approximately one-third of the U.S. equity market and
as such, are positioned to play a major role in corporate governance. 119 Governance power
accrues to the mutual fund family – the larger entity that organizes and sells interests in individual
funds – under their contracts with investors. Take, as an example, an equity mutual fund offered
by Fidelity. Fidelity first assembles the portfolio by purchasing securities and then, sells fund
shares to investors. Fidelity will also utilize an investment adviser to oversee the day-to-day
operations of the mutual fund. 120 Pursuant to the investment contract, the right to cast the
portfolio’s votes, as well as bring shareholder suits, is held by the investment adviser. 121
When it comes to voting, most of the large mutual fund families require the investment
adviser to follow the recommendation of the entity’s corporate governance group. 122 But what
about litigation? How and when do mutual funds pursue shareholder litigation? How does the
conduct of mutual funds in shareholder litigation compare to other institutional intermediaries,
such as pension and hedge funds? And how does it compare to the efforts of individual
shareholder plaintiffs? These are empirical questions, and the sections which follow endeavor to
answer them empirically.
A. Mutual Fund Participation in Shareholder Litigation
117

Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’
Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007),
118
Accord Coffee, supra note 111, at 1536 (“[C]ompensation [is] unobtainable and deterrence [is] deeply
compromised by a variety of inconsistent legal doctrines that pull the punch of private enforcement.”).
119
See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
120
See WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 45–50 (2016); John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit
Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 91 (2010).
121
See
Form
of
Investment
Advisory
Agreement,
L.
INSIDER
(July
25,
2014),
https://www.lawinsider.com/contracts/7HF5OJyY06sdG7X9BQHhkU/blackrock-funds/844779/2014-07-25
(providing that the fund’s investment adviser “ may vote, exercise consents and exercise all other rights appertaining
to such securities and other assets on behalf of the Fund”); cf. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting
Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Apr. 14, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274) (describing how mutual funds are the beneficial owner of the fund’s securities, and thus
the votes accrue to the investment adviser); Jonathan D. Glater, Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail to Collect in
Settlements,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/19/business/suits-contend-mutual-funds-fail-to-collect-in-settlements.html
(“Individual investors in mutual funds may not file a claim for a piece of the pie from a settlement with a company
whose shares the fund owns. The mutual fund owns the shares on behalf of those investors, and so the right to file a
claim
belongs
to
the
fund.”);
Types
of
Investors,
BROADRIDGE,
https://www.shareholdereducation.com/SHE-types_investors.html (last visited June 25, 2019) (“Mutual fund
managers vote on behalf of all of their customers, and, as an individual investor with a limited number of shares, you
can’t influence how the fund votes.”). A small fraction of institutional investors that invest in mutual funds retain
their governance rights. See Section IV.B.
122
See HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., supra note 8, at 22; Griffith & Lund, supra note 14, at 1170–71.
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In order to develop data on whether and how mutual funds engage in shareholder litigation,
we searched court dockets for shareholder litigation involving the largest mutual funds. We ran
our docket searches in Bloomberg Law, an online service that collects docket information from all
federal courts as well as prominent state courts. We searched within the Bloomberg Law
database of all federal district court dockets because securities claims are typically filed in federal
district courts, and we searched within the Delaware Court of Chancery dockets because much
corporate fiduciary duty and appraisal litigation is brought in that court.
We limited our searches to the litigation activity of the ten largest mutual funds over a ten
year period: January 2009 through year-end 2018. We ranked the larget mutual fund families by
the amount of assets under management invested in equity strategies. 123 Because we are interested
in shareholder litigation, we sought to capture the litigation activity of the asset managers with the
largest equity shareholdings; however, this meant that certain large mutual fund families like
PIMCO which primarily offer bond funds, did not make our top ten list. We searched under
various permutations of the names of the following ten mutual fund companies: Vanguard,
BlackRock, State Street, Fidelity, Capital Group, T. Rowe Price, Dimensional Fund Advisors,
BNY Mellon Investment Management, JP Morgan Asset Management, and Invesco. As
summarized in Table 1, below, the combined assets under management of these ten mutual fund
companies is a staggering $24 trillion.
Table 1: The Top 10 U.S. Asset Managers (Equity), December 2018
Asset Manager

Equity AUM

Total AUM

($ billion)

($ billion)

Vanguard

3,200

5,200

BlackRock

3,030

5,980

State Street

1,544

2,500

Fidelity

1,337

2,530

Capital Group

1,113

1,462

T. Rowe Price

539

962

BNY Mellon Investment Management

415

1,700

Dimensional Fund Advisors

395

576

JP Morgan Asset Management

384

1,980

Invesco

381

888

123

We collected this information from annual and quarterly reports whenever possible. For the asset managers that
did not report this figure, we were often able to estimate it by summing the amount of assets in different funds (and we
assumed that multi-asset funds were composed of 60% equities and 40% bonds). Some asset managers did not report
even that information, and in that case, we contacted the asset manager directly.
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By searching under various name permutations, we hoped to capture instances where a
fund family might use alternative business names as well as situations where lawsuits are brought
by individual funds rather than the entity itself—the BlackRock Global Allocation Fund, for
example, rather than BlackRock Advisors. Likewise, by searching for the fund name in any party
capacity, we sought to capture litigation in which the funds participated without necessarily
serving as lead plaintiff. After weeding out unrelated suits—predominantly contract and
employment claims—we were left with a total of 17 suits involving these funds as investors.
Table 2: Participation of Mutual Funds in Shareholder Suits, 2009-2018
Asset Manager

Shareholder Suits

Traditional Shareholder Suits

Vanguard

2

2

BlackRock

8

3

State Street

1

1

Fidelity

0

0

Capital Group

0

0

T. Rowe Price

4

3

Dimensional Fund Advisors

2

1

Investment 0

0

BNY
Mellon
Management

JP Morgan Asset Management

1

0

Invesco

0

0

Total

18

10

Table Two summarizes the total number of shareholder complaints filed by our group of
mutual funds over a ten-year period. The first column includes all shareholder complaints filed
by the relevant funds. However, many of these cases included in the column are not traditional
shareholder suits. For example, BlackRock brought several cases alleging misconduct in
connection with the sale of residential mortgage backed securities (“RMBS”) in which the funds
had invested. Although these cases were brought as derivative suits against the banks as trustees
and also contained federal securities law allegations, they are not traditional shareholder suits
brought against a corporation or its managers. 124 There are five such RMBS cases in the table.
Excluding them reduces the total number of claims brought by BlackRock to 3.
Furthermore many of the cases in the table were brought by different funds against the
same defendants. Three funds (Dimensional, State Street, and Vanguard) brought 10b-5 cases

124

As defined above, a traditional securities suit involves an investor suing a corporate issuer for misconduct or
misinformation. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. In the RMBS suits, investors sued the banks that
packaged and securitized their mortgage loans. Because these suits do not involve a corporate issuer as the
defendant, we treat them as distinct from traditional shareholder suits.
23

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422910

DRAFT

against Petrobras.125 Two funds (BlackRock and T. Rowe Price) brought 10b-5 cases against
Countrywide. Two funds (BlackRock and Vanguard) brought 10b-5 cases against American
Realty/ VEREIT. Two funds (BlackRock and T. Rowe Price) brought 10b-5 cases against
Valeant. Interestingly, BlackRock is also named as a plaintiff along with two other funds (J.P.
Morgan and T. Rowe Price) in an earlier class action complaint against Valeant. 126 Finally, our
docket search found a single appraisal action, the infamous Dell appraisal case in which T. Rowe
Price petitioned for appraisal in Michael Dell’s management buyout but ultimately failed to perfect
its appraisal rights due to an administrative error. 127
In sum, over a ten-year period, the largest mutual funds in the United States, in whom the
management of trillions of dollars of investor wealth is entrusted, brought only 10 traditional
shareholder suits, based on only 5 different episodes of managerial misconduct. 128 All but one of
these claims allege violations of Rule 10b-5 of the federal securities laws. Although we did find
examples of contract litigation in state courts, apart from T.Rowe Price’s appraisal claim in Dell,
we found not a single claim, derivative or direct, brought under state corporate law. Furthermore,
the vast majority of claims in our sample are not representative actions. The only class actions in
the table above are complaints filed against Petrobras and Valeant, and in each of those cases, the
funds involved later filed their own complaints. 129 In no cases did these mutual fund serve as lead
plaintiffs. When the funds in our sample chose to litigate, they opted out of the class and pursued
the claims on their own.
In the sections that follow, we describe the basic facts and procedural history underlying
the four 10b-5 lawsuits we found in our sample. These cases demonstrate at a minimum that
mutual funds could participate actively in shareholder litigation if they chose to do so. The puzzle
remains as to why they do so little of it.
1. Countrywide
In the wake of the financial crisis, the beleaguered mortgage issuer Countrywide Financial
faced litigation from dozens of plaintiffs, which eventually included three mutual fund complexes.
The vast majority of Countrywide’s earnings had come from its mortgage-related operations,
which included originating, purchasing, servicing, and investing in mortgages. 130 During the years
leading up to the financial crisis, Countrywide had lowered its mortgage underwriting standards
significantly and shifted into risky products without disclosing these business practice
modifications to investors. 131 Accordingly, when the crisis hit, Countrywide posted massive
125

Dimensional is also named in an earlier class action complaint against Petrobras. See In re: Petrobras Securities
Litigation, 1:14-cv-09662 (SDNY Dec. 8, 2014).
126
Poetter v. Valeant Pharm. Int'l., 3:15-cv-07658, (D. NJ. Oc. 22, 2015).
127
In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2014). We discuss this case in more detail below.
See infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
128
There were, in other words, only five defendants. The cases we found include the same set of allegations filed
more than once against Countrywide, Petrobras, Valeant, and Vereit.
129
Dimensional filed a separate action after being named in the class action against Petrobras, and BlackRock filed a
separate action after being named in the class action against Valeant. See Sections IIIA 2. And 4. However, two of
the three funds named as plaintiffs in the Valeant class action (JP Morgan and T. Rowe Price) do not seem to have filed
a separate complaint.
130
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
131
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losses and was hastily sold to Bank of America in early 2008. 132 But even before the company was
sold, in August 2007, investors brought a class action suit against Countrywide in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California alleging securities law violations for false and
misleading statements and omissions regarding its lending standards and the quality of its loans. 133
The consolidated complaint was 416 pages and contained 21 claims of securities fraud against 50
defendants.134
Bank of America settled the class action suit in May 2010 for $624 million. 135 But thirty-three
investors, including BlackRock and T. Rowe Price, were unhappy with the settlement and
opted-out so that they could file their own lawsuit.136 By July 2011, a group of fifteen investors,
including the three large mutual fund complexes, sued Bank of America and Countrywide in
district court, again pursuing securities fraud claims arising out of Countrywide’s mortgage
lending practices.137 Those claims were settled confidentially in November 2011.138
2. Petrobras
Once the fifth-largest company in the world by market capitalization, Brazilian oil and gas
giant Petrobras suffered a fall from grace (and a precipitous stock price decline) after the Brazilian
government uncovered a complex corruption scheme in 2015. 139 In 2010, Petrobas began
expanding its production capacity by acquiring and constructing new facilities. But rampant
corruption and bribery within Petrobras led the company to substantially overpay for these
projects.140 After the government investigation uncovered details of the corruption scheme, which
involved thousands of employees and cost the company at least $28 billion, 141 Petrobras’ stock
price declined precipitously. By March 2015, the company’s common stock price had fallen by
80%.142
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By January 2015, Petrobras investors began filing suits under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act in the Southern District of New York. 143 The plaintiffs alleged that the company’s financial
statements were false and misleading because recorded payments were inflated due to large bribes
and overcharges. The plaintiffs also alleged that the company made false and misleading
statements about the integrity of the company’s management and the effectiveness of its
compliance program.144
In February 2015, the court consolidated the claims against Petrobras and appointed
Universities Superannuation Scheme Ltd., a UK pension scheme for university employees, as the
lead plaintiff.145 But in the subsequent months, mutual funds began to file direct actions. By
September 2015, mutual funds owned by Vanguard, Dimensional, State Street, and at least ten
other advisory complexes had all sued Petrobras alleging 10(b) violations. 146 These funds
declined to join consolidated class action, and instead opted to pursue their own claims. The sheer
number of opt-out plaintiffs, as well as their size and importance, led one observer to call Petrobras
“the watershed case for opt-out plaintiffs.”147
By opting out, the mutual funds got several benefits. For one, they settled their claims and were
paid much more quickly than the class action plaintiffs: Dimensional and State Street settled their
lawsuits in November 2016,148 and Vanguard,in June 2017.149 Pursuant to the settlements, the
funds recovered “hundreds of millions of dollars in direct payments.” 150 By contrast, the class
action settlement was not announced until January 2018, and claimants will have to wait years for
the settlement administration process to take place before their claims are paid. And although the
terms of the direct settlements are confidential, the mutual funds likely did better than they would
have under the class action settlement, under which a $2.95 billion payment is expected to result in
only $1.33 per share.151 For Vanguard, which as of December 2018 had only 5,759,641 Petrobras
shares, that would have meant an expected recovery of approximately $7.66 million.152 Further
supporting that conclusion is the fact that Petrobras raised the financial provision allocated for
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shareholder settlements from $372 to $445 million after the announcement of the settlement with
Vanguard.153
3. American Realty/VEREIT
Before 2014, American Realty Capital Properties was known for managing a $30 billion real
estate portfolio that included multiple Red Lobster locations and a large portfolio of single-tenant
homes.154 In April 2014, the real estate investment trust admitted to the SEC that it overstated
income from its operations. Correcting the error “erased roughly a third of [American Realty’s]
value at the time.” 155 On the same day as the announcement, three American Realty
executives—including the CEO and COO—stepped down. 156 By October, the FBI had opened a
criminal probe,157 which ultimately led to an 18-month prison sentence for the REIT’s CFO. 158
In the wake of the scandal, the company rebranded as VEREIT and replaced its board. But this
did not deter plaintiffs from filing multiple class action complaints in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York in January 2015. 159 The plaintiffs alleged that the REIT
violated federal securities laws by making false and misleading statements, by misrepresenting the
company’s business prospects, and by engaging in fraud. 160 The complaints were consolidated
and the New York City Retirement System was named lead plaintiff. 161 However, BlackRock
maintained a separate securities action in the SDNY.162 One other fund—Vanguard, which had a
13% stake in the REIT 163 and had alleged that its investors had “lost billions” due to the
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fraud164—filed a separate securities fraud complaint in the U.S. District Court of the District of
Arizona.165
The class action continues, but the mutual funds have since settled their suits. In June 2018,
VEREIT announced that it had settled the Vanguard litigation for $90 million. 166 A few months
later, in October 2018, VEREIT settled with BlackRock and six other funds that together held 11%
of the REIT,167 for $85 million.168 These settlements exceeded analyst expectations for the class
recovery.169
4. Valeant
Once a large holding of hedge fund and mutual fund investors alike, the Canadian drug
maker’s stock lost almost all of its value after its deceptive and abusive business practices came to
light. At the company’s peak, investors were unaware that Valeant’s business strategy relied on
price gouging—by its own eventual admission, Valeant would buy a company and immediately
raise prices by an average of 66%. 170 To implement this strategy, Valeant “created a secret
network of specialty pharmacies” that would raise pharmaceutical prices and engage in other
deceptive practices to defraud drug purchasers. 171 One of these pharmacies was Philidor, which
purported to be independent but was actually created and controlled by Valeant. 172
By 2015, however, Valeant’s pricing strategy was under investigation by Congress, and
various media outlets had exposed its deceptive practices. 173 Soon after, Valeant’s true
relationship with Philidor, as well as its secret network of pharmacies, was exposed. By October
2015, Philidor shut down, and by February 2016, Valeant admitted to fraudulent accounting and
had announced that it was under investigation by the SEC. 174 As each scandal unfolded,
Valeant’s stock price declined precipitously.
In June 2016, Valeant investors brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey alleging violations of the Exchange Act as a result of Valeant’s false and misleading
statements, as well as its failure to disclose information about its true business practices. 175 Shortly
thereafter, T. Rowe Price filed its own direct action against Valeant, on behalf of dozens of its
164
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mutual funds, that contained similar charges. Up until April 2016, T. Rowe Price had been
Valeant’s third-largest shareholder176 and a steadfast proponent of the company: In March 2016,
even after Valeant’s misconduct had come to light, T. Rowe Price’s top Valeant analyst reassured
investors that “many of Valeant’s strengths have been overlooked.” 177 But by May, T. Rowe had
sold most of its Valeant shares, which had continued to fall in price. 178 And by June, T. Rowe
Price had sued Valeant and six of its executives directly, alleging that Valeant had engaged in
fraud and securities violations.179
In January 2018—about a year and a half after T. Rowe filed its complaint—BlackRock
brought a direct lawsuit against Valeant, on behalf of 80 of its mutual funds, in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey.180 Like T. Rowe and the class plaintiffs, BlackRock’s suit
alleged that the company had violated the securities laws by materially misstating or omitting
material facts that caused Valeant’s price to be artificially inflated. 181 The two direct actions, as
well as the class action, are still pending.
*

*

*

These cases demonstrate that mutual funds could participate actively in shareholder
litigation if they chose to do so. Indeed, these examples are encouraging, as they demonstrate
instances where mutual funds took an active approach to litigation in order to secure additional
compensation for investors, as well as deterrence. But the puzzle remains as to why there are so
few examples. Many other egregious instances of fraud or misconduct occurred over these past ten
years and the ten largest mutual fund families ignored them. Moreover, in each of these instances
of obvious misconduct that attracted lawsuits, none were pursued by more than three of the ten
mutual fund families in our sample. This indicates that once again, the largest mutual funds are
leaving investor money on the table.182
B.

Mutual Fund Participation in Appraisal Actions

The docket search described in the prior section found only one appraisal case involving
any of the ten largest mutual fund families. Recall, however, that although appraisal actions are
brought by a petitioner, who appears in the docket as the named claimant, they are often
176
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prosecuted on behalf of a larger group of dissenting shareholders. 183 Hence, docket searches
under party names will retrieve the names of the petitioners but not the names of other dissenting
shareholders. Thus, insofar as a mutual fund does not file as the appraisal petitioner but rather
participates as an unnamed dissenting shareholder, their role would not have been captured by the
empirical methodology employed in the prior section. Nevertheless, when an appraisal action is
filed, the law requires the defendant to provide a “verified list” of all shareholders eligible for
appraisal so that the petitioner can coordinate with other dissenting shareholders. 184 The verified
list is filed in the public docket of appraisal suits and is thus the key to determining whether
unnamed dissenters were involved in seeking appraisal.
In redesigning our search procedures to identify any appraisal suits in which our mutual
funds may have participated as non-petitioning dissenting shareholders, we began by compiling a
dataset of appraisal suits. To do so, we started with a list maintained by an appraisal arbitrage
hedge fund of appraisal petitions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery over a 10-year period,
2004-2013. The list contained a total of 189 appraisal suits. We then looked up these suits on
Bloomberg Law and searched for the verified list in docket. We found the verified list for 157
appraisal suits. We then sought for any reference to our mutual funds on the verified list. We
found none. Next, to make the time period of the appraisal sample match our sample of
shareholder suits, 2009 through 2018, we searched in the Delaware Court of Chancery Dockets on
Bloomberg Law for the term “verified list” for that time period. We found 303 total filings, many
of which also appeared on the hedge fund’s list. But again, apart from the T. Rowe Price
appraisal petition involving Dell, we found no reference to our mutual funds on the verified
lists.This does not mean that mutual funds never engage in appraisal. It is possible that mutual
funds have an alternative method of seeking appraisal. For example, perhaps they contribute their
shares into a special LLC with no reference to the fund name in order to seek appraisal
anonymously. 185 If so, their participation would have escaped our empirical methodology.
Having read 10 years’ worth of verified lists, however, we can state that such anonymous entities
are rarely involved. The most common dissenters are appraisal hedge funds, individuals, and
family trusts. Of course, it is also possible that mutual funds invest in appraisal by investing
capital with these specialized appraisal hedge funds. If so, again, they would have escaped our
notice. Nevertheless, we have no reason to believe that mutual funds participate in appraisal in
this way. And the hedge fund manager we spoke with on this subject noted that, in his
experience, this did not occur.
However, there is the well-publicized counter-example of T. Rowe Price’s botched attempt
to seek appraisal rights in Dell’s 2013 management buyout. Along with other shareholders, T.
Rowe Price was a vocal opponent of the buyout, in which Michael Dell and his consortium of
buyers would have paid $13.75 per share to take the company private. 186 T. Rowe Price had
intended to vote against the merger so that it could preserve its appraisal rights, but mistakenly
voted in favor due to an administrative error. 187 This mistake ended up costing T. Rowe Price
183
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investors dearly. In the appraisal action, the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that that the
fair value of Dell’s shares was about 20% higher than the amount paid in the buyout, meaning that
T. Rowe Price’s investors lost $194 million.188 To avoid the prospect of investor lawsuits (and the
concomitant bad publicity), T. Rowe Price decided to pay their investors the money that they
would have been eligible to receive from Dell. 189
This example demonstrates that mutual funds can participate in appraisal actions—at least,
when the deal seems obviously bad for shareholders. In the Dell case, the price appears to have
been low enough that T. Rowe Price would have been comfortable scuttling the deal—a genuine
risk when a large shareholder perfects their appraisal rights. This sentiment seemed to be validated
by the Delaware Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the deal price “shortchanged shareholders by
more than $6 billion.”190 It seems unlikely, however, that Dell is the only bad deal in which a
mutual fund owned shares.
*

*

*

Our results reveal that mutual funds almost never participate in shareholder litigation: The
mutual funds in our set—the largest mutual funds in the world, with a combined $24 trillion in
assets under management—participated in a total of 10 lawsuits, based on only distinct claims,
all securities claims, over a 10-year period. To put these numbers in perspective, consider that
studies find over 400 securities class actions were filed in 2018 alone, nearly half of which
constituted merger claims filed under federal causes of action. 191 Excluding merger claims,
Cornerstone finds 1,538 securities class actions filed over the course of our ten year sample
period.192 NERA finds 1,863.193 Whichever denominator you choose, the 10 lawsuits pursued
by mutual fund plaintiffs amount to less than 1% of the total claims available. And that is
counting only securities claims, not the many state fiduciary duty and appraisal claims that could
have been brought during the same period, of which mutual funds brought none. In sum, this
evidence reveals that the largest and most influential mutual funds have essentially forfeited their
use of a principal lever to protect investors.
C. Compared to the Litigation Efforts of Other Shareholder Plaintiffs
To put mutual fund litigation into perspective, we compare the litigation record of other
shareholder plaintiffs. In the sections that follow, we first compare the litigation conduct of
[https:perma.cc/5DQG-UQVK]). Shares must be voted against the transaction in order to have the right to sue for
appraisal. § 262(e).
188
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pension fund plaintiffs. Then we compare the litigation activity of hedge funds and individual
repeat-plaintiffs. This study is not intended to provide an apples-to-apples comparison; instead, we
seek only to provide additional evidence that mutual funds litigate much less often than other
investors in spite of the fact that they hold large investments in a broad swath of companies. We
also highlight interesting differences in litigation patterns between these classes of investors.
1. Public Pension Funds
Much of the literature on institutional plaintiffs in shareholder suits focuses on pension
funds, especially public pension funds and labor union funds, both of which have established
reputations as especially active shareholder litigants.194 The reputation is not entirely positive.
Some of this literature identifies ways in which pension fund managers’ incentives in shareholder
suits depart from the interests of their investors.195 Furthermore, studies document ways in which
pension fund involvement has led to the transfer of pay-to-play emoluments between plaintiffs’
lawyers and pension fund managers.196 We acknowledge these problems but nevertheless ask:
How does the record of pension funds in shareholder litigation compare with that of mutual funds?
We ran a series of docket searches for the ten largest pension funds by assets under
management parallel to the searches we had run for the ten largest mutual funds. We searched
Bloomberg Law, for a period running from January 2009 through December 2018, for all cases in
federal district courts and in the Delaware Court of Chancery in which any of the ten largest public
pension funds appeared as a named party. The pension funds we searched included: CalSTERS,
CalPERS, New York State Common Retirement Fund, Florida SBA, Texas Teachers, New York
State Teachers, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, North Carolina Retirement, and Washington
State Investment Board. These funds were more active than mutual funds, bring a combined total
of 31 shareholder suits—more than three times as many as the ten largest mutual fund
investors—over the period, against a total of 22 defendants. That is so despite managing smaller
portfolios— for example, CalPERS, the largest U.S. pension fund, manages $326 billion in
assets,197 compared to BlackRock, which manages nearly $6 trillion. 198 Not only that, pension
fund portfolios are likely to be less diversified than mutual fund portfolios, meaning that there are
fewer attractive litigation opportunities.
In addition to higher overall numbers, there was a greater diversity in the type of
shareholder suits brought by pension funds. Like the mutual fund cases we found, the pension
fund suits were skewed towards securities claims, and the securities claims were predominantly
10b-5 class actions. But three pension fund suits were based on state law causes of action, as
compared to zero for mutual fund litigants. Many of these suits resulted in large settlement
194
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197
CALPERS, CALPERS AT A GLANCE (2017),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/calpers-at-a-glance.pdf.
198
Christine Williamson, BlackRock’s AUM Down for the Quarter, Year, PENSIONS & INV. (Jan. 16, 2019, 12:00
AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20190116/ONLINE/190119897/blackrocks-aum-down-for-the-quarter-year.
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payments,199 as well as corporate governance reforms—as an example of the latter, the pension
fund CalPERS successfully convinced IAC to abandon its plan to issue non-voting stock that
would have solidified the controlling shareholder’s control over the company. 200
Although we limited our analysis to the ten largest pension funds, a pension fund’s
incentives to litigate may not increase with size. A pension fund’s board members are appointed by
politicians or directly elected by voters. 201 Accordingly, litigation activity may provide a way for
the fund’s board to demonstrate alignment with investors and politicians—regardless of the size of
the pension fund’s investment in the underlying company. For these reasons, earlier studies that
looked beyond the ten largest pension funds reported even starker differences in litigation patterns.
For example, in a study of shareholder-derivative and class action lawsuits challenging M&A
transactions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery from November 1, 2003 to December 31,
2009, David Webber finds that public pension funds and labor union funds dominate the litigation
process, while mutual funds play a minimal role.202 Specifically, of the 137 claims involving an
institutional lead plaintiff in his dataset, Webber found only seven in which a mutual fund served
as lead plaintiff. By contrast, pension and union funds served as a lead plaintiff for 60 cases, and
private non-mutual funds (which include private equity funds and hedge funds) were lead
plaintiffs for the remainder. Mutual funds have more assets under management than public
pension funds do, and they have substantial stakes in the transactions that were subject to
litigation. They would appear to be excellent lead plaintiff candidates, but they do not apply for
the job.203 Another study found similar results with regard to securities class actions. Of 1,811
securities class actions from 1996 to 2005, 97 were led by public pension funds, 61 had union
pension fund lead plaintiffs, but only 12 featured mutual funds as lead plaintiffs. 204

199

As a few examples, pension fund litigants won large settlement payments in suits filed against the following
companies: Big Lots, Inc. ($3.5 million payment to the company in addition to governance and compliance reforms);
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters ($36.5 million payment); and CBOT Holdings ($475 million in additional deal
compensation). See Notice of Pendency and Proposed Settlement of Stockholder Derivative Action at 11–13, In re Big
Lots, Inc. S’holder Litig., Nos. 2:12-cv-445; 2:12-cv-447; 2:12-cv-590; 1:13-cv-753, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65027
(S.D. Ohio 2017); Notice of (I) Pendency of Class Action & Class Certification; (II) Proposed Settlement; (III) Motion
for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Litig. Expenses; & (IV) Settlement Fairness Hearing at 1, La.
Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00289-WKS (D. Vt. filed);
CBOT Holdings, Inc., Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, https://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00016 (last
visited July 1, 2019).
200
In Response to CalPERS Lawsuit, IAC Abandons Plan to Issue Non-Voting Stock, CALPERS (June 23, 2017),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/newsroom/calpers-news/2017/interactivecorp-abandons-plan-non-voting-stock.
201
Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363, 367 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
202
Webber, supra note 15, at 26, 29 tbl.2.
203
Id. at 34 (noting that pension funds “are sophisticated and credible, and Delaware judges would likely be eager to
appoint them if they applied. But they don’t.”); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048 (2007))(discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of mutual fund monitoring, especially their size).
204
C.S. Cheng, et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. Fin. Econ. 356 (2010). There is
also evidence that some institutional-investor lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions, notably public-pension
funds, provide better shareholder outcomes in the form of higher settlements, lower attorneys' fees, and improved
board independence. Id., at at 357-58; Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 895–96 (2005); James D. Cox,
Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities
Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 379 (2008); Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through
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We ran an additional docket search for the litigation activity of the Louisiana Municipal
Police Employee Retirement Fund (“LAMPERS”), which is not among the largest but is reputed to
be one of the most active institutional plaintiffs. Our results confirm this reputation. LAMPERS
was involved in 93 shareholder claims over the ten-year period we studied. These claims
included a large number of both state law fiduciary duty claims as well as federal securities class
actions, predominantly under Rule 10b-5 but also including a small number of claims brought
under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act as well as Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act.
Why are pension funds much more active participants in litigation than their mutual fund
counterparts? In addition to their political motivations, there are other factors at play. Public
pension funds, unlike mutual funds, do not count on corporations as a source of revenue. 205
Furthermore, there may be less network overlap between the boards of public pension
funds—which may consist of fire-fighters, police officers, and teachers—and corporate boards of
directors, which may more closely resemble mutual fund boards. 206 Each of these factors may
contribute to greater willingness, on the part of public pension funds, to pursue litigation against
corporate defendants. Additionally, public pension funds do not compete with each other for cash
inflows. Instead, all covered employees contribute.207 Because pension funds do not compete
with each other for pension assets, any reluctance on the part of pension funds to engage in conduct
that might also benefit their competitors—the collective action problem we describe below—is
non-existent. As state-sponsored monopolists, public pension funds are free to make litigation
decisions without regard to the effect on their (non-existent) competitors.
None of this is to say that public pension funds engage in the optimal amount of litigation.
As discussed, they have their own agency problems, including heightened vulnerability to political
influence.208 Our point here is simply to demonstrate the different approaches that pension funds
and mutual funds take to shareholder litigation. Pension funds are far more likely to assert claims
against portfolio corporations. They are more likely to assert these claims in class action form.
And they are more likely to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.
2. Hedge Funds and Individual Plaintiffs
We also gathered data on the litigation record of hedge funds and individual plaintiffs.
We ran the same Bloomberg docket search—January 2009 through December 2018 for all cases in
federal district courts and the Delaware Court of Chancery—for the ten largest activist hedge
funds (by equity assets) that had been involved in at least 25 campaigns: Icahn Associates Holding
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J EMPIR. LEGAL
STUD. 368, 369-70 (2012).
205
Which is to say they are unaffected by Corporate Client Conflict, discussed infra Part IV.D.1. Accord Webber,
supra note 15, at 36–37.
206
Id.; see also Rock & Kahan, supra note 5, at .
207
See Webber, supra note 15, at 35 (explaining that public pensions funds have “no true competitors” because “[i]f a
fund beneficiary is unhappy with the fund's performance, the beneficiary's only option is to change jobs, not move
one's retirement savings to a competitor.”).
208
Note that this political influence may lead to too little or too much litigation, depending on the political alignment
of the politicians who appoint them. For example, politician contributions from large corporations may reduce
incentives to sue, whereas contributions from the plaintiffs’ bar would likely increase them. See CALPERS, supra note
196.
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LLC, Elliot Management Corp., GAMCO Asset Management, Inc., ValueAct Capital
Management LP, Trian Fund Management LP, Southeastern Asset Management, Inc., Third Point
LLC, Pershing Square Capital Management, Carlson Capital LP, and Starboard Value LP. 209 We
also ran a similar search for the litigation activity of individuals who have repeatedly served as
shareholder plaintiffs.
The hedge funds in our sample did not file a vast quantity of claims. We found 21 distinct
investor suits filed by the ten hedge funds over a 10-year period. 210 But a relatively small number
of intensely litigated cases is commensurate with an activist hedge fund’s investment
strategy—hedge funds are not broadly diversified, and instead make large, concentrated
investments in a small number of companies. 211 As such, we would expect that their overall
litigation record would involve a much smaller number of companies than that of broadly
diversified mutual funds.
In addition, the cases pursued by hedge funds are qualitatively different from the cases
brought by mutual funds. For one, the hedge fund cases are more often state law fiduciary duty
claims than federal securities claims. We found only five investor lawsuits filed in federal district
court by the hedge funds in our sample.212 By contrast, recall that apart from a single appraisal
claim, the mutual funds in our study exclusively brought claims under Rule 10b-5 of the federal
securities laws. They did not bring a single state fiduciary duty suit. 213
The hedge fund cases in our sample directly related to the funds’ governance interventions
in portfolio companies. Four cases involved petitions for appraisal. 214 The remainder were state
209

See SharkWatch 50 (Key Activists), accessed May 15, 2019.
This number represents distinct causes of action, not necessarily distinct claims. For example, funds controlled by
Third Point filed six separate appraisal claims involving Petsmart, which were later consolidated into a single action.
See In re Appraisal of Petsmart, Inc., No. 10782-VCN (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015). Likewise, Icahn Partners filed two
different fiduciary duty suits involving Amylin Pharmaceuticals, one seeking books and records, and another for
breach of fiduciary duty relating to board conduct in connection with an acquisition offer. See Icahn Partners LP v.
Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 7418-CS, (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 2012) (books and records); Icahn Partners LP v.
Amylin Pharm. Inc., No. 7404-VCN, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 2012) (breach of fiduciary
duty). We counted these claims as one and counted all claims involving the same plaintiff against the same defendant
for the same underlying conduct a single time. Two fiduciary duty claims brought by Icahn Enterprises against Dell
for different underlying conduct were counted separately. See High River Limited Partnership v. Dell Technologies
Inc., 2018-0790-AGB (Del. Ch., Oct. 31, 2018) (requesting inspection of corporate books and records); High River
Limited Partnership et al vs Dell Inc et al., 8762-CS (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2013) (suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with Michael Dell’s management buyout).
211
Kahan & Rock, supra note 203, at 1062.
212
Three of these were 10b-5 cases filed as individual actions (two by Elliott, one by GAMCO). See Elliott Assocs.,
L.P. v. AbbVie Inc., No. 1:17-cv-03494 (N.D. Ill. May 09, 2017); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Porsche Automobil Holding
SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Gamco Glob. Series Funds, Inc. v. Vivendi S.A., No. 1:09-cv-07962
(S.D.N.Y. Sept 16, 2009). One was a 10b-5 class action filed by GAMCO. In re Akorn, Inc. Data Integrity Sec.
Litig., No. 1:18-cv-01713 (N.D. Ill. Mar 08, 2018). The fifth case was a federal court case brought by Pershing
Square in the wake of the financial crisis claim alleging that the U.S. Treasury Department illegally deprived them of
the value of their investment in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See Rafter v. Dep’t of the Treasury, No.
1:14-cv-01404-RCL (Dist. Colum. Aug 15, 2014).
213
See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
214
In re Appraisal of Petsmart, Inc., No. 10782-VCN (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015). The other three appraisal cases were
all brought by GAMCO. See Gabelli Small Cap Growth, Gabelli ABC Fund, v. Federal-Mogul Holdings LLC f/k/a
Federal-Mogul Holdings Corp., No. 2017-0330 (Del. Ch. May 01, 2017); Gabelli Securities, Inc., v. Crown Media
Holdings, Inc., No. 12680 (Del. Ch. Aug 23, 2016); In re Zale Corp. Appraisal Litig., No. 9731 (Del. Ch. 2014).
210
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corporate law claims relating directly to activist interventions. Several of the suits in our sample
involve books and records requests, seeking information that will either help the activists
challenge management or simply provide access to the shareholder list so that the activist can
lobby shareholders directly. 215 Several claims seek to compel shareholder meetings in
connections with proxy fights.216 Other suits allege breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with
specific transactions. 217 With the exception of Pershing Square’s claim against the Treasury
Department and Third Point’s appraisal claim, all of the hedge fund claims we found were
motivated by deterrence or governance objectives, not the desire to win compensation in the
lawsuit itself. Hedge funds litigate for leverage to support their interventions. To paraphrase
von Clausewitz, their lawsuits are governance by other means. 218
Finally, it is worth noting that the hedge funds’ claims were generally not brought in a class
or other representative capacity. Third Point’s breach of fiduciary duty claim to invalidate
Sotheby’s poison pill was ultimately joined by class action plaintiffs (two pension funds:
LAMPERS and the Employees Retirement System of the City of St. Louis) and consolidated into a
single action.219 None of the other hedge fund cases we found was litigated as a class action.
Instead, all were direct actions filed by the hedge fund as named plaintiff.
As a final comparison, we examined the litigation patterns of repeat-play individual
plaintiffs. One of us has recently studied litigation filed by seven individuals who regularly
appear as named plaintiffs in shareholder suits—Robert Berg, Stephen Bushansky, Natalie
Gordon, Paul Parshall, Matthew Sciabacucci, John Solak, and Shiva Stein. 220 Over a five year
period, from 2014 through 2018, half the time period of our mutual fund study, these seven
plaintiffs filed 281 shareholder suits. The vast majority of these lawsuits (76%) involve
challenges to mergers and acquisition transactions, which are typically settled for non-pecuniary
relief or for mootness fees.221

215

See, e.g., High River Ltd. P’ship v. Dell Techs. Inc., No. 2018-0790-AGB, (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2018); High River
Ltd. P’ship v. Forest Labs., Inc., No. 7663-ML, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2012); Icahn
Partners LP v. Amylin Pharm. Inc., No. 7418-CS (Del. Ch. Apr. 12,. 2012); Verified Complaint Pursuant to 8 Del. C.
§220 at 13, High River Ltd. P’ship v. Forest Labs., Inc., No. 6614-CS, 2011 WL 3528152 (Del. Ch. filed June 28,
2011).
216
See, e.g., High River Ltd. P’ship v. Biogen Idec Inc., No. 4642-VCS (Del. Ch. June 3, 2009); P S Fund 1 LLC v.
Allergan Inc., No. 9760-CB (Del. Ch. June 13, 2014); Starboard Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd. v.
comScore, Inc., 2017-0533-AGB, Del. Ch. July 27, 2017; Starboard Value and Opportunity Master Fund Ltd. v.
Office Depot, Inc., No. 8640-VCL (Del. Ch. June 12, 2013).
217
See, e.g., Emps. Ret. Sys. of of St. Louis v. Sotheby’s, No. 9497-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 2014); Icahn Partners, LP,
v. Barry D. Zyskind, No. 2018-0358-AGB (Del. Ch. 2018); High River Ltd. P’ship v. Dell, Inc., 8762-CS (Del. Ch.
Aug. 1, 2013); Icahn Partners LP v. Amylin Pharm. Inc., No. 7404-VCN, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 85 at *1–2 (Del. Ch.
April 20, 2012).
Icahn brought cases against Dell (books & records and breach of FD), AmTrust Financial (to halt IPO),
218
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, HOWARD & PARET EDS., 87 (1983) ("War is the continuation of politics by other
means.").
219
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, Nos. 9469-VCP, 9497-VCP, 9508-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at (Del. Ch. May 2,
2014).
220
Sean J. Griffith, Class Action Nuisance Suits: Evidence from Frequent Filer Shareholder Plaintiffs, in CAMBRIDGE
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CLASS ACTIONS, FITZPATRICK & THOMAS, EDS. (forthcoming 2020), available at
[SSRN CITE].
221
Id., at 7.
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Initially, these plaintiffs filed the bulk of their lawsuits in state court, but this trend has now
reversed, with most of their claims now being filed in federal court. The transformation took
place over our collection period. In 2014, 82% of these plaintiffs’ claims were brought in state
courts. In 2015, the percentage of their claims brought in state court fell to 68%, then fell even
more dramatically in 2016 to 41%. By 2017 and 2018, the relationship had flipped completely,
with 96% and 87% of their claims being brought in federal rather than state court. 222 This reversal
is likely a direct response to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s Trulia opinion, which made it more
difficult to settle merger cases for non-pecuniary relief. 223 Such cases are the bread and butter
claims of these plaintiffs. Rather than dropping them claims, these plaintiffs merely shifted them
to federal court, bringing them under Section 14a of the Exchange Act, to which Trulia does not
apply.224
The litigation activity of repeat-play individual plaintiffs and hedge fund plaintiffs can be
seen as polar opposites. Individual plaintiffs bring a great many merger claims on a class or other
representative basis and settle them for non-pecuniary relief. Hedge funds, by contrast, bring a
small number of lawsuits, typically on a non-representative basis, often for injunctive relief aimed
at increasing leverage in their governance interventions. The indicia of litigation agency costs are
high for claims brought by individual repeat-play plaintiffs and low for claims brought by hedge
fund activists. Interestingly, both litigate differently from mutual funds, which most often bring
federal securities claims for monetary relief on a non-representative basis.
IV.

Why Don’t Mutual Funds Participate in Shareholder Litigation?

The most striking outcome of the empirical analysis above is the simple finding that mutual
funds generally do not participate in shareholder litigation. Over the ten-year time period we
studied, mutual funds rarely pursued securities claims, filed a single appraisal case and never
participated in state law fiduciary duty suits. By contrast, pension funds litigated frequently
across a variety of claims; hedge funds used state fiduciary duty suits as leverage in activist
interventions; and repeat-play individual claimants filed a mass of claims. While we do not mean
to suggest that all of these suits would have benefitted mutual fund investors if pursued, there are
many examples of missed opportunities. Most obviously, the claims against Valeant,
Countrywide, Petrobras, and American Realty only attracted the attention of a few funds in our
sample; other funds with standing to sue missed out on large settlement payments.
Nor do the data suggest that mutual funds are merely free-riding, letting others do the hard
work of litigation, while they stand to collect the benefits. Mutual funds often fail to claim
settlement proceeds at the end of class action cases. 225 Furthermore, mutual funds exert no
222

Id., at 9-10.
See supra Section II.B.2.
224
Griffith, supra note 102.
225
See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58
STAN. L. REV. 411, 424 (2005) (finding that only 28% of institutional investors filed claims to collect settlement
proceeds, effectively leaving substantial sums of money unclaimed); see also Glater, supra note 121 (noting lawsuits
filed in the wake of this discovery). More recent work suggests not much has changed in this regard. See 10 Years
Removed from Cox & Thomas: A Survey of the Claims Filing Landscape for U.S. and Non-U.S. Securities Litigation
Recoveries,
KESSLER
TOPAZ
MESLTZER
CHECK
LLP
(Nov.
5,
2015),
https://www.ktmc.com/news/10-years-removed-from-cox-thomas-a-survey (estimating that 35% of eligible
223
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apparent effort to channel the conduct of such litigation or to prevent litigation agency costs from
wasting corporate assets. In other words, with rare exceptions, mutual funds participated in
shareholder litigation in essentially the same way as rationally apathetic shareholders—by staying
out of it.226
These results are surprising given the large blocks held by the mutual funds in our sample.
For example, Vanguard has at least a 5% stake in nearly every S&P 500 company. 227 A stake of
that size should provide a powerful incentive to participate in litigation that might lead to
shareholder compensation. It would also provide the fund with the ability to shape litigation
outcomes and contain litigation agency costs if it was interested in doing so.
Furthermore, mutual funds tend to be diversified across the market, which makes them
repeat players in litigation and governance. Because they can anticipate that similar issues will
recur again and again in their portfolio, they ought to have strong incentives to use litigation to
achieve market-wide deterrence and governance benefits. If a shareholder lawsuit will deter bad
behavior, the mutual fund will accrue benefits across their broad portfolio. Additionally, mutual
funds’ limited exit options should increase the desirability of using litigation to implement
deterrence and governance reform. This is especially true for the large index fund providers: As
Bill McNabb, the former CEO of Vanguard put it: “Index fund managers must care as much as—if
not more than—anybody else. We essentially own stocks forever, because we can’t sell out of a
stock listed on an index.”228
Yet we have found mutual funds generally do not use the lever of litigation to influence the
governance of portfolio companies. Why not? This part evaluates potential explanations for the
failure of mutual funds to participate in shareholder litigation. It considers legal barriers,
structural obstacles, agency costs and conflicts, the circularity problem, and finally, the possibility
that non-participation in shareholder litigation is a revealed preference of mutual funds.
A. Legal Barriers
It is possible that some kinds of shareholder claims present substantive legal barriers that
prevent mutual funds from taking a leading role. For example, 10b-5 claims require both that the
claimant be a “purchaser or seller” of the underlying security and that the claimant relied upon the
defendant’s misrepresentation in transacting in the security, both of which may present difficulties
for index funds in particular.229 As long-term investors, most of an index fund’s investment in the
relevant company will have been acquired prior to the defendant’s false statements and held
through to the revelation of truth. Index funds, in other words, will generally be holders, not
buyers or sellers, and the bulk of their portfolio may thus be ineligible to bring a 10b-5 claim.

institutional investors claim settlement proceeds); see also Jessica Erickson, Automating Securities Class Action
Settlements, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (reporting conversations with claims administrators who estimate that
“approximately 20 to 25 percent of eligible shares will file claims”)
226
John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 304 (2010)
(stating that “the same apathy that confounds the opt-in class action at the outset also arises at the back end of the
opt-out class action when claims must be filed”).
227
Fichtner et al., supra note 4, at 311.
228
McNabb, supra note 11.
229
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975).
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Nevertheless, even index funds engage in significant trading activity. 230 Index funds trade
each time an investor buys into or sells out of the fund. Furthermore, index funds trade in order to
bring their portfolio holdings in line with the index they track. As a result, although a large
portion of their assets under management may not trade during the relevant period, it is highly
likely that large index funds will engage in at least some trading during the period. As a result,
index funds likely have standing to be involved in virtually every claim.
What about reliance? If an index fund does trade to rebalance its portfolio or to
accommodate investors buying into or selling out of the fund, it may have difficulty establishing
that it did so in reliance upon a portfolio company’s underlying misstatement. The claim might
be that any such trading is motivated by the company’s proportional representation in the index,
not by anything the company has said or done. Such an argument might seem to have the effect of
systemically rebutting reliance, at least for index funds.
While we acknowledge that this argument renders reliance contestable, we also think index
funds have a powerful reply, based upon the dynamics of fraud on the market. 231 The price of a
portfolio company’s shares determines its proportional representation in an index. 232 As a result,
if fraud inflates prices, it will also lead to a security’s over-representation in the index. Hence, in
buying shares based upon a security’s proportional representation in an index, the fund buys more
(or less) of the security than it otherwise would as a result of the fraudulent inflation (or deflation)
of the security’s price. This is just a further link in the chain of reliance. Funds may not trade in
direct reliance on price, but they do buy in reliance on the security’s proportional representation in
the index, which is determined by price. Fraud thus affects an index fund’s investment much as it
does an active investor who trades based on price. The reliance requirement likely does not pose
a meaningful barrier.
Furthermore, contrary to what we have just argued, if either reliance or the purchaser/seller
requirement were the primary barrier to mutual fund participation in shareholder litigation, we
would expect active funds to be more involved in shareholder litigation than index funds. 233 Yet
this is not the case. None of our empirical investigations into the litigation activity of mutual
funds suggested any difference between active and passive funds, or more specifically, mutual
fund companies that predominantly offer active funds (such as T. Rowe Price and Fidelity) and
those that predominantly offer passive funds (such as Vanguard and State Street). Their
participation in shareholder litigation is essentially indistinguishable. This suggests that
substantive legal rules are not the problem.

230

See generally Davidson Heath, et al., Passive Investors Are Passive Monitors (Mar. 15, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript),
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2019&paper_id=1827
(documenting trading by passive and indexed mutual funds).
231
See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274–77 (2014) (reaffirming the fraud on the market
theory); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (adopting the fraud on the market theory).
232
See, e.g., Chad Langager, How Is the Value of the S&P 500 Calculated?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/sp500calculation.asp (last updated June 28, 2019).
233
Active funds seek to overweight good performing companies and underweight bad performing companies. See
generally Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997, 2048 (1994) (“Overweighting means that the institution owns a greater share of
the specific company than it owns of the market generally. An overweighted firm has a greater incentive to intervene,
because it will gain more from success than its competitors.”).
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Finally, not only are mutual funds eligible plaintiffs in securities suits (and indeed, in each
of the shareholder suits we identified above), they are ideal plaintiffs in derivative suits. Because
they are paradigmatic long-term investors, index funds easily satisfy the requirement that
derivative plaintiffs hold shares from the time of injury through conclusion of the suit (the
“contemporaneous ownership” requirement). 234 The contemporaneous ownership requirement
may pose an obstacle to active traders who prefer exit to litigation, but because long term
shareholding is the core of their investment strategy, it poses no obstacle to index funds. Yet we
could not find a single derivative suit filed by an index fund (or any of our mutual funds) over a
ten-year period. The explanation must be something other than substantive legal barriers.
B. Structural Obstacles
A second possibility is that the structure of ownership rights and decisionmaking authority
allocated to mutual funds presents an obstacle to active participation in shareholder litigation. As
discussed, the power to bring litigation on the basis of portfolio company holdings is a default
feature of the standard mutual fund investment contract. 235 But not every mutual fund investor
gets the standard contract. Approximately 11% of mutual fund investors are institutions—funds,
corporations, and financial institutions—not individuals. 236 Those institutional investors may
have different contractual relationships with the mutual fund family than the individuals who
invest in managed accounts. For example, some institutional clients contract for investment
advisory services only.237 Pursuant to these arrangements, institutional clients may retain their
voting and litigation rights.
This division of rights can present problems for the mutual fund complex, which will not
be able to sue on behalf of the clients that have retained their litigation rights. In general, mutual
fund families opt to solicit consent from those institutional clients before bringing a shareholder
suit. Some investors might never consent to litigate,238 and administrative difficulties associated
with soliciting and obtaining investor consent might deter mutual funds from bringing shareholder
suits in the first place. While we recognize that this administrative difficulty exists, we do not view
it as a substantial impediment to shareholder litigation. For example, funds could issue different
shares to institutional and individual clients in order to separate those on whose behalf they or do
not have the right to litigate.239

234

See generally J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673
(2008) (discussing the contemporaneous ownership requirement and recommending that it be eliminated).
235
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
236
COLLINS ET AL., supra note 3 (showing that institutions held 11% of mutual fund assets in 2015).
237
See,
e.g.,
VANGUARD.
VANGAURD
INSTITUTIONAL
ADVISORY
SERVICES,
1
(2016),
https://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/OCIOEXEC.pdf (explaining that institutions can secure Vanguard as a
co-fiduciary and retain investment advice for assets that remain under institutional management).
238
For example, a corporate pension fund (e.g., the Apple 401(k) plan) seems unlikely to consent to litigation against
the corporate issuer (Apple). See infra Part IV.D.1.
239
The practice would be similar to issuing different classes of shares to track different fee arrangements, a practice
currently followed by several mutual funds in order to reward (and encourage) higher investment amounts. For
example, Vanguard offers lower expense ratios its “Admiral” class shares, which differ from its “Individual” class
shares only in their minimum investment thresholds. See Vanguard Group, “Admiral Shares help keep your costs
under control,” available at https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/admiral-shares?WT.srch=1&cmpgn=PS:RE.
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Perhaps the obstacle is not the organization of the fund’s investors, but rather the
organization of fund management. The mutual fund representatives that we spoke to informed us
that litigation decisions are often siloed in the general counsel’s office and made without input
from either the stewardship group charged with overseeing portfolio company governance or the
portfolio managers charged with making investment decisions. Insofar as fund’s litigation
activities are housed in the general counsel’s office, distinct from fund management, then those
with the best information and expertise—that is, portfolio managers with intimate knowledge of
the companies in which they invest—may be unable to influence whether and how litigation
proceeds. Note too that legal departments are generally seen as cost rather than profit centers,
suggesting incentives—remaining within budget and mitigating risk—that are inconsistent with
entrepreneurial litigation. As a result, they may disfavor bringing even those claims that are
suggested to them by portfolio managers. 240
Still, while we acknowledge that organizational obstacles can pose a challenge, such
problems are entirely within the power of fund families to solve. The siloing of legal and
operational departments can be solved by reorganizing reporting lines within the firm and
empowering fund managers or stewardship groups to consider at least some kinds of shareholder
claims. Moreover, funds could hire outside law firms to assist in these efforts; they could also
hire in-house attorneys to assist fund managers and members of the stewardship team in evaluating
and monitoring claims.241 These costs would more than pay for themselves if they resulted in just
one additional recovery each year.242 The fact that funds have generally not made these changes
suggests that some factor other than structural obstacles explains the failure to participate in
shareholder litigation.
C. Circularity
Perhaps it is the structure of mutual fund holdings, not their organizational structure, that
inhibits shareholder litigation. Mutual funds are broadly diversified. Index funds, in particular,
own essentially all publicly traded securities. As a result, some shareholder suits instigated by a
mutual fund will be paid by the fund itself, as a shareholder of the corporate defendant. 243 This, of
course, is a version of the circularity problem reviewed above. 244
In our conversations with mutual fund representatives, they emphasized the circularity
problem in answering why they are not more active participants in shareholder litigation. And
they have a point. The circularity critique applies against several of the forms of shareholder
240

Portfolio managers may have their own reasons for avoiding litigation, such as a fear of having their access to
management cut off as a result of bringing a claim. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14. We consider these
incentive conflicts below. See infra Part IV.D.1.
241
Many mutual fund families are in the process of expanding their stewardship groups. See, e.g., Ning Chiu,
BlackRock’s Annual Letter to CEOs Focuses on Doing Good and Continues to Emphasize Governance and Strategy,
DAVIS
POLK
(Jan.
17,
2018),
https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2018/01/blackrocks-annual-letter-to-ceos-focuses-on-doing-good-and-continu
es-to-emphasize-governance-and-strategy/ (explaining that BlackRock plans to double the size of its corporate
governance group).
242
As Section III.A reveals, mutual funds can reap tens of millions of dollars when settling claims against portfolio
companies.
243
Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679, 1688 n.32 (2011).
244
See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
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litigation we reviewed above. Circularity suggests that compensation from successful securities
class actions and even derivative suits are unimportant to long-term diversified shareholders.
Circularity would also apply in the rare merger cases that recover additional deal compensation,
provided that both the buyer and the target are represented in the fund’s portfolio. In such cases,
broadly diversified long term shareholders would not necessarily prefer that the buyer pay more
for the target company since they are effectively paying themselves. 245 However, in this context,
the extent of the circularity problem depends on the relative weight of a fund’s holdings. For
example, a fund with a substantially larger economic stake in the target than the acquiring
company may still have incentives to pursue merger litigation or seek appraisal. 246
More fundamentally, however, compensation is not the only goal of shareholder litigation.
Shareholder suits can also provide deterrence and governance enhancements. Lawsuits that
actively police managerial misconduct will benefit the fund across its holdings not only by
punishing misconduct when it occurs but also by discouraging misconduct at other firms in the
portfolio. Likewise, governance-enhancements extracted through litigation may improve the
performance of firms in the portfolio, leading other firms to copy these innovations, and enhancing
the value of the portfolio as a whole.
Moreover, not all shareholder suits are intra-portfolio. Shareholder suits may also arise
against firms as they exit the portfolio. In some cases, the mutual fund may be able to exit from the
investment by selling down shares: for example, T. Rowe Price’s actively managed funds
unloaded the bulk of their Valeant shares before commencing litigation against the drug
company.247 But not all funds will be able to exit by selling their shares. In those circumstances, a
company can still exit the fund’s portfolio through bankruptcy or acquisition, in which case
compensation paid to shareholder plaintiffs would not be funded by other public shareholders.
For example, a severe fraud may push a company into bankruptcy, in which case shareholder
recoveries from securities or fiduciary duty lawsuits come not from other public shareholders but
from assets otherwise available to creditors of the firm. 248 Shareholder suits against Enron and
WorldCom, firms driven into bankruptcy by managerial misconduct, were not funded by public
company shareholders and therefore do not present the circularity problem.
Likewise, acquisitions of public companies by non-public entities, such as private equity
funds, also do not invoke the circularity concerns. Because a company that is taken private does
245

Because broadly diversified shareholders are as sensitive to overpayment as they are to underpayment, they would
have a preference for passivity in takeover defense. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Target's Management In Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L .REV. 1161 (1981); Ronald J. Gilson, Gilson,
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819
(1981). For index funds, however, the incentives may be slightly different. Index funds are likely to own a
proportionally greater interest in large market cap companies than in small market cap companies due to their
weighting in the index. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text. Their interest in M&A thus depends on
who is buying whom. If the deal is one in which a large company buys a smaller one, as is often the case, the index
fund may prefer to pay the smallest possible premium because they are more exposed to overpayment than
underpayment. This will be a systematic preference. Index funds will be indifferent to premia only in deals in which
companies of similar size (and therefore similar weigh in the index) acquire each other.
246
For index funds, however, this will not often be the case. As long as the acquiror is the larger company (as it
usually is) and the index is weighed by company size (as indexes usually are), the acquiror will likely be a larger part
of the index portfolio than the target.
247
See supra Section III.A.4.
248
They likely come from D&O insurance proceeds. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 111, at 1826 (discussing how
D&O policies may become an asset of the bankruptcy estate).
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not by definition have a public company buyer, public company investors are not on both sides of
the transaction. The Dell transaction we discussed above is a good example of this. 249 As a
result, shareholder suits that cause additional consideration to be paid in take-private transactions,
whether these suits are brought as fiduciary duty claims or appraisal actions, are not subject to the
circularity critique. Mutual funds would benefit from such suits.
D. Agency Problems
Mutual funds’ lack of engagement in shareholder litigation may be explained by a
principal-agent problem: the interests of the institution charged with making the litigation
decisions may diverge from the interests of the institution’s investors. Agency cost issues are
frequently raised to account for perceived defects in how mutual funds exercise their voting
rights.250 They may thus also play a role in explaining how mutual funds exercise litigation
rights. 251 In discussing these issues, we will distinguish between two distinct agency cost
problems. First, mutual fund complexes are for-profit institutions and suffer from conflicts of
interest. Second, intermediation creates collective action problems that may cause mutual fund
complexes to engage in a sub-optimal amount of litigation. We address each of these in turn
below.
1. Corporate Client Conflict
Mutual funds’ incentives to cater to the interests of their corporate clients may lead them
astray from acting as faithful stewards of their investors’ capital, a situation we have elsewhere
referred to as “Corporate Client Conflict.”252 The most obvious but by no means only such
conflict is corporate 401(k) accounts. Insofar as fund families derive profits from assets under
management and corporate 401(k) accounts are a large source of potential assets under
management, fund families have a strong incentive not to upset the corporations that direct 401(k)
assets by, for example, suing them. 253 In this way, corporate client conflict may undermine
mutual funds’ efforts in litigation.
Consider BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset managers with over $6 trillion
AUM.
Approximately 40% of BlackRock’s AUM comes from corporate pension plans. 255
254

249

See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 83, at 789; Lund, supra note 14, at 106–14;
Rock & Kahan, supra note 5.
251
See, e.g., Webber, supra note 15, at 14–15 (discussing how agency problems that may compromise mutual funds’
efforts in litigation).
252
Griffith & Lund, supra note 14, at 1157.
253
This conflict results in problems for investors in other contexts. See William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power:
An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1442 (2006); Tamar Frankel,
Advisory Fees: Evolving Theories, 10 INV. L. 21, (2003); John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 639–40 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor
Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 172 (2004).
254
This example also appears in our forthcoming publication, BU paper. Note that by choosing BlackRock as an
example, we do not suggest that it experiences more severe conflicts than other mutual fund complexes. Similar
conflicts likely exist at all institutional investors.
255
BLACKROCK,
FOR
YOU
6
(2018),
http://ir.blackrock.com/Cache/1500109547.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1500109547&iid=4048287.
250
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Investors pay a fee that is calculated as a percentage of these assets, and that fee accrues to
BlackRock, rather than the fund. 256 In total, these fees make up about 88% of BlackRock’s
quarterly revenue.257
Recently, however, BlackRock, like all mutual fund complexes, has faced pressure to
lower fees. This is in part because competition over fees has become more intense, especially for
the passively managed mutual funds in which BlackRock specializes. 258 Hence, BlackRock has
focused on diversifying its revenue sources, primarily by providing other services to corporations
and institutional clients.259 BlackRock is not unique in this respect—large mutual fund complexes
often provide a range of client services, including brokerage, underwriting, insurance, or banking
services. But insofar as BlackRock and other funds depend upon corporate revenue lines, they
may be less likely to oppose corporations, in either voting or litigation.
Evidence supporting this view comes from findings that mutual fund complexes are very
likely to vote for management proposals, especially when they hold a large percentage of assets
under management in passive investment vehicles.260 Likewise, mutual funds almost never bring
shareholder proposals or proactively engage in shareholder activism. 261 If voting against
management likely threatens the mutual fund business, suing management certainly does. 262 Any
suit that requires the mutual fund to take a position contrary to management—which is to say all
shareholder suits—would threaten to disrupt its ability to retain or win 401(k) assets or other
business from management. These incentives are compounded by reputational effects. For
example, if BlackRock were known in the market to litigate against managers, regardless of
whether they in fact managed assets or had other business from that particular corporate client, it
might discourage other corporate clients from placing business with BlackRock.
Nevertheless, Corporate Client Conflict does not necessarily dampen funds’ incentives to
bring all forms of shareholder litigation. A company exiting the portfolio through bankruptcy or
acquisition will not be able to punish mutual funds for litigating against it (although its managers,
if their careers are not also brought to an end, may). Corporate Client Conflict may therefore
operate as a weaker constraint with regard to bankrupt defendants, especially where misconduct
suggests the end of the managers’ careers as well. Likewise, Corporate Client Conflict may not
constrain funds from bringing shareholder suits against target companies that have been acquired.
However, insofar as the managers of these companies do not themselves exit the market but go on
256

Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 9.
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6
(2018),
http://ir.blackrock.com/Cache/1001230788.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001230788&iid=4048287.
258
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(Mar.
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(unpublished
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Emiliano Catan, Shareholder Proposal Working Paper; John Morley, Too Big To Be Activist, S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3225555.
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See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. OF FIN. ECON. 552, 554
(2007) (quoting Jack Bogle, the founder of Vanguard, in an SEC comment letter, noting that “Votes against
management may jeopardize the retention of clients of 401(k) and pension accounts.’’).
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to manage other firms, the Corporate Client Conflict may still exert some deterrent effect on
merger suits brought by mutual funds. Managers who are in jail or otherwise out of the C-suite
are in no position to retaliate, but managers who go on to serve as managers at other firms are.
2. Collective Action Problems
The reluctance of mutual funds to participate in shareholder litigation may also be related
to the collective nature of lawsuit recoveries. Compensation paid in a securities class action, for
example, is awarded pro rata to the class, meaning that a mutual fund that sues benefits according
to its proportional stake in the company, but so too do mutual fund competitors whose portfolios
also include the corporate defendant. Likewise, any benefits from deterrence or governance
enhancements won through litigation will also be enjoyed not only by the fund bringing the lawsuit
but also by every other fund (and every other investor) that also owns the underlying company.
Insofar as mutual funds compete for capital inflows on the basis of their performance relative to
other funds, they have little incentive to use litigation to improve performance on a pro rata
basis.263 This is especially true if lawsuits are costly, in which case litigious funds bear all the costs
while sharing the benefits with rival funds. The collective nature of lawsuit recoveries thus
inhibits mutual funds from participating in litigation to bring them about.
Several scholars have recently focused on the collective action problem arising from
mutual funds’ measurement of their performance on a relative basis. 264 As one of us recently
pointed out, this problem is most pronounced for index funds.265 Active funds, by contrast, may be
able to increase their relative performance by using the levers of corporate governance, including
litigation.266
Our point here is not to claim that collective actionproblems are insurmountable, but to
acknowledge their role in shaping mutual funds incentives to litigate. In particular, collective
action problems may explain the failure of mutual funds to serve as lead plaintiffs. 267 Many
forms of shareholder suits seek to reduce the cost of participating as plaintiff—for example, taking
attorneys’ fees out of the recovery, taxing them to the corporate defendant rather than the plaintiff
and, in some cases, providing an incentive payment to lead plaintiffs to offset costs incurred in
monitoring class counsel.268 But none of these strategies address the problems created by the
263

Professor Rock was one of the first to draw attention to this phenomenon as a barrier to institutional investor
engagement in corporate governance. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 461–62 (1991)) (discussing the free-rider problem created by the fact that the
fruits of any such efforts will be shared with the rest of the class, while the costs will be borne by the mutual fund
alone).
264
See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 97–98; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 83, at 890.
265
Lund, supra note 14, at 119–20.
266
Id. Others contest that these incentives will lead to too little stewardship. Fisch, Hamdani, and Solomon claim that
index funds compete with active funds for capital inflows which may give them an incentive to engage with corporate
governance. See The New Titans of Wall Street, supra note 14. Rock and Kahan, meanwhile, acknowledge that
performance benefits must be shared with other investors but emphasize the direct benefits in fees that the largest
index funds stand to gain from improvements in portfolio company performance. See Rock & Kahan, supra note 5.
267
See Webber, supra note 15, at 34–35.
268
See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical
Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1320 (finding that incentive fees are common in federal class actions). The PSLRA
generally bars incentive awards in securities class actions. 15 U.S.C. §78-u-4(a)(4). However, Delaware courts
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sharing of the benefit. This incentive problem is compounded by the Corporate Client Conflict
discussed above—a litigious fund may not be able to find corporate clients. Better, then, to free
ride on the efforts of other investors.
Nevertheless, the collective action problem does not apply to non-pro rata recoveries. Not
all shareholder suits are class actions. As noted above, mutual fund plaintiffs can and
occasionally do opt-out of shareholder class actions in order to bring their own claims. For
example, each of the shareholder suits brought by fund families against Countrywide, Petrobras,
Valeant, and American Realty were individual actions and therefore not subject to the collective
action problem. Whatever funds BlackRock recovered in these claims were retained by
BlackRock alone and not shared with Vanguard or State Street. The fact that the collective action
problem does not apply to them may explain why these claims were brought in this way, but it does
not explain why there were only three of them over a ten-year period. Likewise, the collective
action problem does not apply to appraisal actions which, like individual securities suits, are not
shared with a broader class that necessarily includes a funds’ competitors. Therefore, the fact that
funds do not bring appraisal actions cannot be attributed to collective action problems.
3. Diminished Incentives Due to Fee Structure
Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst point out that mutual funds have incentives to under-invest
in stewardship because they receive only a small percentage of any gains. 269 As discussed, mutual
fund fees are set at a percentage of assets under management. As such, the mutual fund ccomplex
will not be interested in investing in stewardship or litigation if those actions are unlikely to
increase assets under management, and therefore, the amount of fees that the complex collects. In
other words, the problem might not be that the benefit is shared, but that the benefit to the complex
is small or negligible.
However, as the examples in Section III.A demonstrate, stewardship litigation can generate
compensation and deterrence benefits for mutual fund investors. Mutual fund portfolio managers
owe fiduciary duties to their investors. They would therefore seem to be obligated to pursue
litigation in best interests of their investors without regard to the impact on their own fees.
E. A Revealed Preference on Stewardship
Finally, focusing on the parallel between voting and litigation as alternative stewardship
techniques gives rise to a further possibility—that mutual funds’ failure to participate in
shareholder litigation reveals their actual preferences with respect to stewardship generally.
According to this view, the difference between their willingness to vote in shareholder elections
and their reluctance to litigate comes from the simple fact that voting is emphasized and in some
cases required by regulators while litigation is not. Under these circumstances, the failure to
engage in litigation thus can be read to suggest that if voting were not the subject of regulatory
attention, mutual funds would not vote either.

have occasionally awarded incentive fees. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 5878-VCL (June 30, 2017)
(awarding $1.25 million in incentive fees to plaintiffs).
269
See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 14 (manuscript at 34–36).
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Mutual funds almost always vote.270 And, increasingly, they boast about it.271 This was
not always so. Indeed, Jack Bogle, the inventor of the index fund, recalled a time when mutual
fund managers believed that they should leave the performance of the companies in their portfolios
to “the invisible hand of the marketplace.” 272 But as investor dollars continued to flow into mutual
funds, rendering them a powerful force in corporate governance, the SEC took action to make their
fiduciary obligations clear—at least with respect to voting. Specifically, in 2003 the SEC adopted
rules stating that investment advisors are required by fiduciary duty to cast votes in the best
interests of their investors and requiring mutual funds to disclose how they vote. 273 Overlaying
these obligations are regulations created by the Department of Labor that strongly encourage funds
managing ERISA assets to vote.274 Although many mutual funds do not manage ERISA assets,
fund advisors may reason that given the lack of an obvious distinction between pension fund
fiduciary duties and mutual fund fiduciary duties, they are likewise compelled to vote. 275
Although there are good reasons to question this legal interpretation, it may nevertheless be
followed by fund managers to mitigate compliance risk. 276 As a result, funds now employ
third-party proxy advisors and in-house stewardship teams to manage the voting of their massive
portfolios.277 And they do so largely because regulators have told them to.

270

See Broadridge & PWC, 2018 Proxy Season Review, PROXYPULSE, Oct. 2018,, at 4,
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/gated/broadridge-2018-proxy-season-review.pdf (reporting institutional
investor participation at 91%, compared to 28% for ordinary “retail” investors). For discussion of the reasons why
mutual funds are now actively voting, see infra Part II.B.
271
See VANGUARD, supra note 13, at 3 (emphasizing “four pillars” of engagement: board composition, executive
compensation, oversight of risk and strategy, and governance structures); Asset Stewardship, supra note 10 (“Our
approach to stewardship is designed to have an impact through thought leadership, engagement, proxy voting and
client disclosure.”); Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited July 2, 2019) (noting
that “our responsibility to engage and vote is now more important than ever”).
272
See, e.g., Sarah Krouse et al., supra note 4.
273
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6(a) (2019); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270,
274) (2003) [hereinafter Voting Disclosure Rule].
274
The Department of Labor articulated its position first in a set of letter rulings. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz,
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23,
1988) (Feb. 29, 1988) (reprinted in 15 PENSION REP. (BNA) 71, 391) (“The decision[s] as to how proxies should be
voted ... are fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y,
Dep’t of Labor, to Robert Monks, Institutional S’holder Servs, Inc. 3 (Jan. 23, 1990) (reprinted in 17 P ENSION REP.
(BNA) 244) (“The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of
proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.”). These rulings were later reaffirmed in guidelines stating that “the
fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the management of voting rights
appurtenant to those shares of stock.” Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed.
Reg. 61,731, 61,732 (Oct. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. 2509.08-2 (repealed 2016)).
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Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. L. 217, 219 n.4 (2018) (noting that the effect of the
Department of Labor’s ruling “has been that investment advisers to mutual funds routinely vote the shares of those
mutual funds”).
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See Griffith, supra note 14 (manuscript at 54) (arguing that voting is not necessarily compelled by mutual fund
advisors’ fiduciary duties).
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A deeper look at their voting record leaves much to be desired. For example, mutual fund complexes—and
especially the large passive ones—support management much more often than other investors. Bubb & Catan, supra
note 260 (manuscript at 3). They also follow their proxy voting guidelines closely, achieving impressive uniformity
in voting across vastly different funds. Griffith & Lund, supra note 14, at 1157; Lund, supra note 14, at. 125.
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Regulators have made no such pronouncement with regard to litigation. Neither the SEC
nor the Department of Labor has ever adopted rules suggesting that fund advisors’ duties to their
investors compel them to litigate. Nor are we suggesting that they should. But the obvious
parallel between the benefits attainable through voting and the arguably greater benefits attainable
through litigation suggest that if mutual fund stewardship programs were driven by the desire to
secure benefits for investors, such programs would also include litigation.
What would happen if neither were required? While we cannot, of course, answer this
question definitively, one strong possibility is that mutual funds would neither vote nor litigate.
This may be going too far. We have shown, after all, that mutual funds rarely engage in litigation,
not that they never do. Moreover, the fact that mutual funds generally do not litigate need not
imply that funds are indifferent to providing benefits for their investors but perhaps only that they
are unaware of the benefits that they might provide through litigation. The question thus becomes
whether and how mutual funds could create value for their investors by engaging in shareholder
litigation. This is our central focus in the next Part.
V.

A Mission Statement for Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation

In considering how mutual funds should approach shareholder litigation, we begin by
recognizing the unique position that mutual funds occupy in the market. Many mutual funds are
market investors. They hold a broadly diversified portfolio that puts them on both sides in many
shareholder suits. Index funds in particular, by owning essentially all publicly traded equities, are
paradigmatic market investors.
Adopting the market investor’s perspective on shareholder litigation invokes severe
circularity concerns, at least with respect to lawsuits seeking compensation. However, it does not
render funds indifferent or hostile to shareholder litigation as a whole; market investors should be
interested in pursuing extra-portfolio suits, as well as suits that result in improved deterrence or
governance enhancements. Furthermore, adopting the perspective of the market investor
suggests an important role for mutual funds in containing litigation agency costs. Because the
cost of wasteful litigation is distributed throughout the market portfolio, mutual funds have an
opportunity to exert a gatekeeping role, refusing to participate in suits and objecting to settlements
that fail to create meaningful benefits for shareholders.
These considerations allow us to frame a mission statement for mutual funds in shareholder
litigation. In it, we elaborate four key principles to guide mutual funds in evaluating and pursuing
shareholder claims. First, mutual funds should litigate extra-portfolio for compensation.
Second, mutual funds should litigate intra-portfolio to increase deterrence or, third, to enhance
corporate governance. Fourth, mutual funds should intervene to minimize litigation agency costs.
We discuss each of these principles in the sections that follow and also suggest how mutual funds
might overcome obstacles to implementing the mission statement—including the structural
impediments and agency problems described above. As we will show, it is possible for mutual
funds to implement the mission statement without unduly burdening either the institution or its
investors. In fact, we argue that by adopting a few simple changes, mutual funds will be able to
reap litigation benefits without substantially increasing their costs.
Therefore, the regulatory pressure may be alleviating the symptom of the problem—the lack of voting—rather than
resolving the underlying agency problems that compromise mutual fund voting.
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A.

Litigate Outside of the Portfolio for Compensation

The circularity critique suggests that it will generally be self-defeating for mutual funds to
seek compensation against intra-portfolio defendants since the funds will be on both sides of such
cases and thus pay themselves in the event of a recovery. But as discussed, not every instance of
shareholder litigation presents an intra-portfolio problem. In these cases, mutual funds should
litigate for compensation because any amount recovered would increase overall portfolio returns,
benefitting the fund’s investors. In the subsections that follow, we describe examples of cases that
would not present an intra-portfolio problem for mutual funds and thus should be a primary focus
for mutual fund litigation.
1. Exit Cases
When a company exits the mutual fund’s portfolio, the mutual fund may be able to litigate
for additional compensation without running into the circularity problem. In particular, when a
company is acquired or goes bankrupt, the mutual fund may be able to challenge misconduct
without worrying that it will fund its own recovery. We address each exit scenario in turn.
In the acquisition context, shareholders can bring derivative or securities claims
challenging the merger, as well as appraisal suits, in order to increase the amount they receive in
the deal. Note again that when mutual funds stand on both sides of the “v,” the desirability of
participating in shareholder litigation challenging the merger will often depend on the relative size
of those investments. 278 From the mutual fund’s perspective, litigating to increase the
consideration paid in connection with the acquisition of one portfolio company by another is
typically pointless, and once litigation costs are taken into account, wasteful. Such claims benefit
only those mutual funds with a significantly larger stake in the target than in the acquirer.
But mutual funds should favor merger claims when the acquiring company is not in the
fund’s portfolio. This will typically be the case in a going-private transaction, but it may also be
true in cases where the acquiror is not in the index for other reasons. In such cases, mutual funds
should consider filing derivative or direct claims seeking additional consideration. Appraisal
actions are also possible, but they present a special challenge for mutual funds. Appraisal suits
are a potentially powerful mechanism to increase consideration paid in acquisitions. But the
mechanics of appraisal suits raise the specter of destroying the deal. First, because appraisal
rights arise only when the shareholder has voted against the transaction, a large blockholder
looking to perfect their appraisal rights may cause the deal not to be approved. 279 Additionally,
even if seeking appraisal does not cause the transaction to be voted down, many acquisition
agreements contain a term allowing the buyer to terminate the agreement if a sufficiently large
group of shareholders seeks appraisal. 280 A large blockholder seeking appraisal may thus be
enough to scuttle the deal. Mutual funds should therefore weigh the appraisal option carefully,
seeking it only where there are indicia of wrongdoing—a cursory process infected with
278

See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(j) (2019)
280
See Boone, et al. supra note 92, at 25 (discussing “appraisal out” clauses and finding that they are less common as
the likelihood of appraisal rises).
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self-interest—and where their opposition will not lead to the failure of the deal or where they do
not mind if it does.
Second, apart from acquisition, firms may also exit the portfolio through bankruptcy.
When this occurs, shareholders may be able to bring derivative or securities law claims against
managers whose misconduct caused the corporation to fail. Because the shareholders’ interest is
generally extinguished when firms fail, these may not seem to be a promising setting for investor
compensation. However, when the firm failure is caused by fraud or mismanagement, there may
often be a derivative suit or securities claim against the individual managers that perpetrated the
fraud. These cases are typically funded by D&O insurance and, on occasion, by contributions
from the managers themselves.281 As a result, such claims present an opportunity for the mutual
fund to secure compensation without funding the recovery through the portfolio. 282
2. Extra-Portfolio Defendants
Not every lawsuit will involve a portfolio company as defendant, and mutual funds should
aggressively pursue monetary recoveries in those that do not. Such claims arise in two basic
contexts: (1) derivative suit recoveries funded by individual managers, and (2) securities claims
against non-issuer defendants. We address each of these contexts in turn.
In a paradigmatic derivative suit, the shareholder sues on behalf of the company to force a
culpable manager to pay funds back into the corporation. Because such recoveries are funded by
individual managers, not the corporation itself—corporations are barred by state law from
indemnifying mangers in such cases283—they do not present the same circularity problem as other
compensation-based claims. Insurance, however, complicates this dynamic. Most D&O
policies provide coverage for derivative suits. 284 As a result, derivative suit recoveries may be
largely funded by D&O insurance, which again raises the specter of circularity since corporations
pay for D&O policies.
There is an exception, however, for cases establishing actual fraud, either through
settlement or adjudication. Policies exclude actual fraud from coverage. 285 This suggests a
narrow way out of the circularity problem. The market investor’s incentive to bring derivative
suits is strongest when the evidence suggests actual fraud, in which case recoveries will be funded
by individual defendants, not by the company either directly or indirectly through insurance.
281

For example, the former directors of Enron contributed funds to settle the securities class actions involving that
firm. See Rebecca Smith and Jonathan Weil, “Ex-Enron Directors Reach Settlement,” Wall St. J. (Jan. 10, 2005)
(noting that 10 former Enron executives agreed to contribute a total of $13 million to the settlement).
282
Even when the recovery is funded wholly by insurance, because the companies are exiting the portfolio, the insurer
will not be able to collect future premiums to recoup the losses. However, the fund may have to consider whether the
insurer is likely to raise premiums for other companies—if so, the market investor will bear these costs across the
portfolio. Further complications may be introduced into this analysis if the insurer is itself a portfolio company. But
even in such cases, the structure of D&O coverage, involving multiple insurers and reinsurers, not all of which are
public companies and therefore within the portfolio, suggests that at least some of this cost will fall outside of the
portfolio.
283
§ 145(a)–(b).
284
Baker & Griffith, supra note 111, at 1803. Moreover, the deductibles for derivative suit recoveries are
substantially lower than the deductibles for other forms of loss under the policy, such as the company’s
indemnification obligations or its own liabilities in securities claims. Id. at 1804 n.38.
285
Id. at 1804–05.
50

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422910

DRAFT

Such claims will likely be rare—the cost of litigation, often funded by the corporation through the
D&O policy, may often exceed the potential recovery from individual defendants. But even if
they are rare, such suits may provide some compensatory benefit, and as discussed below, an even
greater benefit through deterrence.
The second form of extra-portfolio litigation arises in connection with securities cases
against non-issuer defendants. For example, cases under Section 11 of the Securities Act may be
brought against a range of non-issuer defendants including individual directors and officers,
underwriters, and accountants. Although seeking compensation from individual directors and
officers in such claims may again raise circularity problems through the D&O policy, claims
against underwriters and accountants may not. Because some underwriting firms—for example,
Goldman Sachs—are publicly traded and therefore present in the market investor’s portfolio,
compensation-based claims against such defendants do effectively suffer from a circularity
problem.286 Nevertheless, some underwriters and most accounting firms are not publicly traded
and therefore not present in the market portfolio. Mutual funds might therefore pursue
compensation-based claims against such defendants. Likewise, securities claims under Rule
10b-5 may be brought against those who aid and abet the corporation in committing fraud. 287 As
long as aiding and abetting defendants are not public companies, recoveries against those firms are
not funded by shareholder plaintiffs themselves.
B.

Ensure that Litigation Inside the Portfolio Provides Effective Deterrence

The circularity critique also does not reach the deterrence rationale for shareholder suits.
The basic goal of deterrence in civil litigation is to make the wrongdoer internalize enough of the
cost of her activity to induce her not to engage in socially harmful conduct. 288 By pursuing
deterrence goals, mutual funds would act as “private attorneys general,” policing their portfolio for
misconduct.289 There are two ways for mutual funds to serve in this role: either as lead plaintiffs,
bringing claims themselves, or as overseers of shareholder suits brought by other plaintiffs, using
their influence to ensure that the suits accomplish meaningful deterrence. We address each in
turn.
First, mutual funds should seek to serve as lead plaintiffs for strong shareholder claims.
As lead plaintiffs, mutual funds would be in the best position to ensure that the lawsuit
accomplished meaningful deterrence. Most obviously, mutual funds could insist on personal
liability for responsible managers as a condition to resolving shareholder suits. Or, in cases of
severe managerial misconduct, mutual funds could insist upon the termination of top managers
and, by pre-committing to vote against any board employing these managers in the future,
effectively ban them from the management of publicly traded corporations. Mutual funds can
thus enhance deterrence by imposing a credible threat of punishment through civil litigation.
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See Rose & Squire, supra note 243, at 686–89.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161–64 (2008).
288
On the problem of setting sanctions to promote optimal deterrence, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 483 (2004).
289
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 227–30 (1983) (discussing virtues and vices of private attorney general model in
securities litigation).
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Mutual fund participation in merger litigation can also enhance deterrence. When mutual
funds are on both sides of public company deals, their principal interest in merger litigation will be
to deter serious misconduct in the deal process more than it will be to extract additional
consideration from the buyer. By serving as the class representative in cases where misconduct
may be present, mutual funds can insist that managers bear personal responsibility for the deal
process, again threatening personal liability or portfolio-wide bans of managers that engage in
serious misconduct. Likewise, in a derivative suit, mutual funds could pursue claims to extract
genuine deterrence against specific corporate managers and refuse to settle for corporate
therapeutics that offer little or no value. 290
Serving as lead plaintiff or class representative comes at a cost. However, given the
willingness of attorneys to litigate shareholder suits on a contingency fee basis, the cost will
principally be one of time and attention. Furthermore, some forms of shareholder suits offer fees
to offset such costs borne by lead plaintiffs and class representatives. 291
This would seem to be
an ideal role for mutual fund stewards, with the availability of fees offsetting the costs of
stewardship.
Still, mutual funds cannot bring every shareholder suit. The PSLRA limits the number of
times a single plaintiff can serve as lead plaintiff in a private securities class action to five times in
three years.292 Nor, we expect, would they want to bring every claim. As a result, even if mutual
funds were to become more involved in shareholder litigation, we expect that other plaintiffs
would continue to bring many suits on a class or other representative basis. Nevertheless, mutual
funds retain a critical role in these suits as well. Their block-holdings put large mutual funds in an
excellent position to oversee shareholder suits brought by other plaintiffs. 293 This leads us to our
second point: Mutual funds should actively oversee shareholder suits brought by other plaintiffs
and use their influence to ensure that these suits achieve meaningful deterrence.
In an oversight role, mutual funds can use their leverage as class members to avoid both
underdeterrence and overdeterrence. If the class representative and their legal team disregarded
their input, large mutual funds could mount a leadership challenge, alleging inadequacy of the
class representative, seeking sanctions for inadequate representation of counsel, and offering to
take control of the litigation effort. The ability of mutual funds to credibly threaten to do so in
virtually every shareholder suit would have a feedback effect on the incentives of class counsel.
Understanding that mutual funds will countenance intra-portfolio litigation only when it produces
meaningful deterrence, class counsel would pursue litigation only in appropriate cases. In sum,
by actively engaging in an oversight role, mutual funds could improve the deterrence effect of
shareholder suits on the whole.
Nevertheless, a major obstacle to accomplishing deterrence goals through shareholder
litigation arises from D&O insurance policies that indemnify managers and the corporations they
serve for losses incurred in shareholder litigation.294 Insofar as D&O insurance holds companies
and their managers harmless for the kind of conduct leading to shareholder claims, we cannot
290

On the debate over therapeutic relief in the settlement of derivative suits, see supra notes 53–64 and accompanying
text.
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See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2019).
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Rose, supra note 108, at 1354–64 (2008) (suggesting that the SEC be given oversight authority to pre-screen 10b-5
complaints to protect against overdeterrence).
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Baker & Griffith, supra note 111, at 1832–33.
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expect liability in shareholder suits to adequately deter managerial misconduct. This leads us to
the third priority for mutual funds: if funds are to use shareholder litigation to create meaningful
deterrence, they should first consider encouraging portfolio companies to realign their D&O
policies to be consistent with deterrence objectives.
Most D&O policies include two basic types of coverage. First, individual-level coverage
protects individual managers against covered losses.295 Second, entity-level coverage protects the
corporation itself from losses arising from its indemnification obligations to individual managers
and from losses it incurs as a named defendant in shareholder suits. 296 The vast majority of losses
incurred under D&O policies are incurred under entity-level coverage. 297 Entity-level coverage
effectively means that, apart from the deductible, the corporation suffers no harm from managerial
misconduct provided the settlement is within the limits of the insurance policy. When corporate
losses are indemnified by an insurance company, the corporation therefore has less of an incentive
to police the conduct of its managers to prevent misconduct ex ante. In this way, the principal
effect of entity-level coverage is to render corporations less sensitive to managerial misconduct.
In prior co-authored work, one of us has argued that there is no good explanation for this form of
coverage, only a bad one—that is, agency costs. 298 Managers use D&O insurance to sever
shareholder litigation from its deterrence function.
Mutual funds could reestablish the deterrence function of shareholder litigation by
minimizing the distortions introduced by entity-level coverage. One way of doing this would be
simply to eliminate entity-level D&O coverage, insisting that policies cover only individual
directors’ liabilities.299 Restructuring policies in this way would protect against managerial risk
aversion while at the same time leaving corporate assets exposed in shareholder suits. Corporate
losses in shareholder suits would be rendered more salient. Uninsured losses would have a
greater impact on share price and on incentive compensation packages. As a result, the
corporation would likely take greater care to avoid them ex ante. Eliminating entity-level D&O
coverage would thus improve the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation.
If their appeals to restructure D&O coverage falls on deaf ears, mutual funds might be able
to achieve a similar effect by insisting, either as lead plaintiffs or as prospective objectors, that a
significant portion of any recovery not be funded by insurance. Forcing the corporate defendant
295

This is referred to as “Side A coverage” under most D&O policies. Id. at 1802.
Losses incurred as a result of corporate indemnification obligations are covered under “Side B” of the D&O policy,
and losses directly incurred by the corporation as a defendant are covered under “Side C.” Id.
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See id. at 1803 (“Our participants confirmed that the vast majority of D&O insurance losses are incurred under
Side B and C—that is, entity-level coverage. Thus, to a substantial extent, D&O insurance is corporate insurance.”)
(citation omitted).
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Id. at 1841–42 (footnote omitted), (arguing that “[i]n order for shareholders to benefit from entity-level D&O
coverage, there must be some benefit to the coverage other than pure risk distribution, which shareholders could
accomplish more efficiently through portfolio diversification. Although some plausible explanations have been
suggested . . . [n]one . . . accounts for the pure risk distribution form of D&O insurance that we observed . . . . We are
therefore left with only one satisfactory explanation for the form of D&O insurance that we observed: agency costs.
Managers do not want insurers monitoring their decisions ex ante and they do not want them managing their defense
ex post. Both monitoring and defense management would reduce managers' autonomy and, relatedly, their ability to
profit at the shareholders’ expense.”) (concluding that “our research strongly suggests that the prevailing form of
D&O insurance benefits management at the shareholders' expense”).
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This form of coverage exists. It is referred to in the industry as “Side-A only” coverage. Side-A only coverage
benefits firms by addressing the risk-aversion of individual directors, thereby encouraging directors to serve without
distorting their incentive to monitor.
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or, in extreme cases, individual managers, to fund losses would have the same effect as eliminating
entity-level coverage but on an ad hoc basis. Another way to accomplish the same thing would be
to plead actual fraud in the complaint, thereby trigging the fraud exclusion and eliminating D&O
coverage from the recovery.300 However they do it, mutual funds should work to improve the
deterrence effect of shareholder by limiting the role of D&O insurance.
C.

Litigate to Implement Meaningful Governance Reforms

Shareholder litigation can produce governance enhancements, for example, by dismantling
obstacles to acquisitions or activism and also by improving corporate compliance programs. 301
Given that mutual funds advertise their interest in improving corporate governance, it seems
natural that they should consider using litigation as a tool for doing so. Furthermore, given the
systemic improvement that governance enhancements promise across portfolios, it seems
reasonable to expect mutual funds to litigate for improved governance much as they might litigate
for improved deterrence.
But the same issue that compromises index fund voting also affects strewardship
litigation—mutual funds are unlikely to know how to improve governance at a given firm in the
portfolio. Although it is possible to understand the basic effect of governance terms and to know
their average effect on firm performance—staggered boards, for example, make it harder to
replace the board of directors and may have a negative average effect on firm performance 302—it is
much harder to say what the optimal governance arrangement for a particular firm will be. 303
There is no “one-size fits all” governance arrangement.304 Even staggered boards may enhance
performance for some firms.305 Hence, knowing what is best for a particular firm requires a high
degree of company-specific information. 306

300

See supra. Because most D&O policies exclude actual fraud from coverage, pleading actual fraud and insisting
upon an admission of fraud in settling the claim would void the insurer’s obligation to cover the resulting loss. Most
shareholder suits are carefully plead to avoid triggering the fraud exclusion, thereby retaining access to insurance
proceeds. However, insofar as mutual funds press shareholder claims more for their deterrence than for their
compensation value, they may prefer to plead their claims intentionally to trigger the fraud exclusion.
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See supra notes 28–30.
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Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Effective Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence,
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 898, 937 (2002).
303
See also Miroslava Straska & H. Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of
the Literature, 49 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 933, 950 (2014) (broadly surveying the literature on the effects
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effects of these provisions on shareholder wealth remain uncertain”).
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higher proportion of intangible assets); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of
Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 104 (2016); see also Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential
Effects of Classified Boards on Firm Value, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3993, 4011 (2013) (finding that in complex firms
the benefits of staggered boards may outweigh the costs).
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Mutual funds are generally in a poor position to evaluate the company-specific effects of a
given governance arrangement. Index funds in particular lack the incentive to invest in acquiring
company-specific information since their business model is essentially to hold the market as a
whole and drive down the costs of investing.307 Active funds may have more of an incentive to
invest in acquiring this information and, in such cases, may share their information with index
funds in the same family of funds.308 But information-sharing of this type will not always be
effective. Active funds typically hold a much narrower slice of the market than index funds. 309
They may not price the effect of governance in their analyses of portfolio companies. 310 And they
often get it wrong.311 Free-riding on the efforts of active funds will not always provide index
funds with sufficient information to intelligently analyze governance arrangements.
The decision to use litigation to secure governance reforms, however, is different than
relying on voting and engagement. One key difference is the involvement of a lawyer, which can
be both helpful and harmful. On the one hand, a trusted attorney can seek out opportunities for
governance litigation and present them to the mutual fund complex. Although the mutual fund
tends to lack firm-specific information, cases involving gross misconduct may present enough red
flags to justify the decision to proceed.312 And as the suit progresses, the litigation process itself
will uncover additional information that can help the attorneys and mutual fund governance staff
craft a settlement that addresses the specific problem.
Consider again the examples we highlighted above. Governance litigation proved to be
an effective tool in undoing the harms of the stock option back-dating scandal. 313 Likewise, the
CalPERS intervention at IAC successfully prevented management from solidifying its control
over the company through the issuance of non-voting stock. 314 Finally, the settlement of the
derivative suit against 21st Century Fox in the wake of sexual harassment claims against the
company resulted in the establishment of a “Workplace Professionalism and Inclusion Council”
aimed at correcting the deficiencies of the compliance program and improving the workplace
environment.315 While we take no position on whether such programs achieve their goals, we
note that this governance reform emerged only after the litigation process produced information
concerning the specific deficiencies then existing at the company, giving the plaintiffs an
opportunity to target reforms to the company’s specific needs. This process might not be perfect,

307
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but it operates on better information and offers more carefully tailored solutions than the
one-size-fits-all governance reforms typically offered in shareholder proposals. 316
Nevertheless, the use of litigation to achieve governance reforms comes with the risk that
attorneys will use lawsuits to push worthless reforms merely to extract fees from the defendant
corporation. If the cost in fees is greater than the benefit of the reforms, then investors are
harmed, not benefited, by the litigation. This suggests that mutual funds’ role in policing
governance litigation for indicia of litigation agency costs, a subject we address in greater detail
below, may be as important as litigating to produce governance reforms. Because the critical
question is whether contingency fee attorneys are tempted to litigate (and settle) when their clients
would prefer that they not, mutual funds should consider using in-house counsel, whose
compensation does not depend on the outcome of the claim, to evaluate whether to bring the claim
and to monitor the conduct of any litigation ultimately brought. Because in-house counsel have
no incentive to continue litigation beyond the point that it provides a legitimate benefit to the
company (or the plaintiff class), they can be trusted to voluntarily dismiss non-meritorious claims.
D.

Intervene to Contain Litigation Agency Costs

Most shareholder suits are not brought by mutual funds but rather by others suing in a class
or other representative capacity. Yet even if mutual funds are not directly involved as plaintiffs,
may still be adversely affected by the outcome of these suits. When corporations pay to settle
non-meritorious cases317 or agree to pay attorneys’ fees in settlements that produce no value for
the plaintiff class,318 all shareholders are affected. As holders of the market portfolio, mutual
fund investors bear the costs of such suits. As a result, an important role for mutual funds in
shareholder litigation lies in intervening to reduce litigation agency costs.
Mutual funds should oversee shareholder litigation in order to avoid both overdeterrence
and underdeterrence. Part of their role in this oversight capacity is to ensure that good claims
produce good results—that is, meaningful deterrence. Another part of their role, however, is to
ensure that bad claims are not pursued. Because attorneys’ fees fuel the filing and settlement of
non-meritorious claims, mutual funds acting in an oversight role should intervene to prevent
attorneys from recovering fees for non-meritorious claims.
One way of doing this is by
objecting to settlements.
Class and derivative suit settlements require a fairness hearing before they can become
binding on unnamed shareholders. 319 If the judge does not approve the settlement, the settlement
316

See Griffith, supra note 14, at YY.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 437 (1988); Avery Katz, The
Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 5 (1990); D. Rosenberg & S.
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4–5 (1985).)
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See Coffee, supra note 40, at 20; Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, (1991);
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Rubenstein, supra note 74. At the fairness hearing:
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If class action attorneys sell out their clients, the judge should perceive that the settlement does not
live up to the value of the claims and reject it accordingly. Conversely, if class action attorneys file
a frivolous case, the judge should perceive that the settlement is merely a nuisance payment, reject it
for that reason, and dismiss the case.
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does not bind the class. 320 The trouble with fairness hearings, however, is that there is no
adversarial interest to frame the problem for the judge. 321 Instead, “[t]he contending parties have
struck a bargain, and have every interest in defending the settlement and in convincing the judge
that it is in accord with the law.”322 Questionable assertions of fact and law are not scrutinized by
opposing counsel. Experts are not cross-examined or even questioned, and opposing views are
not presented. A judge who questions the value of the settlement must do so on her own, in the
face of all of the evidence presented by the parties before her. 323 Given the apparent weight of the
evidence before them and their otherwise crowded dockets, judges can perhaps be forgiven for
generally rubber-stamping settlements to which the named parties have, after all, agreed.
Settlements need, and frequently lack, a motivated gatekeeper. 324
Mutual funds can act as gatekeepers by objecting to non-meritorious class settlements and
presenting adversarial evidence at the fairness hearing. Courts would very likely take the
arguments offered by mutual fund objectors very seriously were they to appear in this role. 325
There is evidence that such objections can in fact succeed in causing judges to throw out
settlements and refuse to approve fee awards. 326 Moreover, the mere potential for objection may
deter the filing of non-meritorious claims. Unlike rationally apathetic shareholders who lack the
Id., at 1444. See also Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65,
128 (2003) (advocating an active adversarial process during fairness hearings as “a kind of trial on the merits of the
settlement”); Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 402 (2011) (advocating a larger
gatekeeping role for judges in settlement).
320
Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 968–69 (2014)
(citing RUBENSTEIN ET AL., 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.6 (5th ed., 2011); Howard M. Erichson, The Role of
the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1020–25 (2013)) (“What binds the class is not the
agreement between the defendant and the lead plaintiffs or class counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving
that agreement. The binding effect of a class settlement, in other words, must be understood as a function of judicial
power.”).
321
Griffith, Corporate Benefit, supra note 64, at 21-23 (emphasizing information asymmetries in the settlement
hearing).
322
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1984). Accord Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) (referring to settlement hearings as “pep rallies jointly
orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel”).
323
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016).
324
Rubenstein, supra note 74, at 1452–67 (examining various proposals for reducing agency costs at the settlement
stage).
325
Courts have said so. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484–VCG, 2015 WL
5458041 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015).
326
One of us has been active in bringing objections to settlements and in providing testimony to judges evaluating
settlements of shareholder suits. See, e.g., Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 744 (S.D. Ind. 2017)
(rejecting settlement after objection by Sean Griffith); Stein v. Blankfein, No. 2017-0354-SG, 2018 WL 5733671, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2018) (rejecting settlement objected to by Griffith); Brief of Sean J. Griffith as Amicus Curiae at
1–4, Trulia, 129 A.3d 884 (No. 10020-CB), 2015 WL 6391945 (opposing settlement, ultimately rejected by court);
Letter from Sam Glasscock III, Vice Chancellor, Court of Chancery of the State of Del. to Counsel at 7, In re Riverbed
Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG (Del. Ch. filed Dec 2, 2015) (reducing attorneys’ fees after objection
by Griffith); Entry of Appearance, In re PMFG, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. filed June 29,
2015) (rejecting settlement after objection by Sean Griffith); Griffith v. Quality Distrib., Inc., No. 17-3160, (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2018) (adopting Trulia as Florida law); Statement of Reasons, Vergiev v. Aguero, Docket No. L-2276-15
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016) (rejecting settlement objected to by Griffith); Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns,
Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), rev’d, 148 A.D.3d 146 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017) (rejecting settlement after Griffith testimony).
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information to object to such settlements,327 mutual fund block-holders bear the cost of such suits
across their portfolio.328 Furthermore, as market investors, funds have standing to appear in every
case, threatening to object, or in appropriate cases, to challenge the adequacy of counsel or even
file sanctions motions.329 Through interventions such as these, mutual funds could calibrate the
deterrence effect of shareholder suits by controlling litigation agency costs.
Suits that settle for non-pecuniary relief—the paradigmatic form of relief in state law class
and derivative actions—may be low-hanging fruit. What about the damages awards and
monetary recoveries that are more typical of securities class actions? While there may still be a
role for objections for inadequate monetary relief, it may also be the case that mutual funds
operating from the perspective of the market investor would often prefer that monetary relief not
be awarded at all. As discussed above, the logic of the circularity critique suggests that mutual
funds would often prefer that shareholder suits not be brought to achieve compensatory ends but
rather for deterrence alone. What should these funds do when faced with the prospect of
monetary recoveries in settlement? The answer, in our view, is that mutual funds should
frequently opt-out of such settlements.
Opting out of class litigation serves two purposes. First, it protects the mutual fund’s
ability to litigate for higher rewards and faster payment, when appropriate. 330 Second, it allows
mutual funds to exclude their shares from the class recovery when the compensation offered in
settlement does not serve the interests of their investors. By opting-out of settlement, whether or
not they pursue claims of their own, mutual funds can limit the cost of such suits. For example,
consider a 10b-5 class action claiming damages of $1 per share in which 10 million shares trade
during the class period. If mutual funds are responsible for 30% of the trading activity during the
holding period, then by opting out of the settlement, they effectively reduce the potential recovery
in the class action from $10 million to $7 million. If monetary compensation is not beneficial to
mutual fund investors—as a result, for example, of the circularity critique—then mutual fund
shares ought not to be included as a basis for recovery to the plaintiff class. Moreover, by
excluding their holdings as a basis for damages (and fee) awards, mutual funds effectively reduce
the cost of such claims while still preserving the potential for a compensatory relief for
undiversified shareholders. Opting-out of compensation, in other words, does not have the same
327.

Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation:
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1548–50 & tbl.2 (2004) (showing that the objection rate is
low across case types).
328.
Mutual funds can distinguish themselves from hold-up objectors by refusing to settle their objection in exchange
for a fee. Compare Fitzpatrick, supra note 99, at 1633–42 (highlighting concerns of objector “blackmail” and the use
of quick-pay provisions used by class action counsel) with Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to
Disclosure Settlements: A How-to Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 315 (2017) (noting that “an objector can offer to
assuage concerns on this point by providing an affidavit attesting that he or she will not sell or settle an objection
without court approval”).
329
The PSLRA requires courts to make Rule 11 findings in class action securities litigation, a requirement that is often
disregarded in practice. 15 U.S.C. 77-z1(c) (2019); Henderson & Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with Mandatory
Procedural Rules under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Journal of Legal Studies. Mutual fund class
members could intervene to demand Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who engage in misconduct or who simply
pursue shareholder suits when the benefits are outweighed by their costs. The threat of Rule 11 sanctions would
create an important downside from the pursuit of securities class actions and again deter unaccountable conduct in
litigation.
330
Consider here the mutual fund suits against Countrywide, Petrobras, American Realty, and Valeant. See Section
IIIA.
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effect as an objection. It preserves the remedy for those who can prove they were harmed while at
the same time reducing the cost of the claim for diversified investors, for whom the payment of
monetary relief plus attorneys’ fees essentially amounts to waste.
In sum, mutual funds should act to minimize litigation agency costs and thereby control
both underdeterrence and overdeterrence. Tools at funds’ disposal include interventions and
objections to settlement. Mutual funds should insist on meaningful deterrence while also opting
out of intra-portfolio claims based solely on compensation, thereby mitigating the waste inherent
in such claims.
E.

Implementing the Mission Statement

We have now identified several ways in which mutual funds could benefit their investors
by engaging in shareholder litigation. Funds should view litigation as a component of
stewardship. The failure to participate in shareholder suits should, in some circumstances, be
considered a failure to act in the best interests of their investors.
But this leaves the question of how the decision to litigate should be made and who should
be the one to make it. We imagine that, ex ante, stewardship groups could promulgate litigation
guidelines along the lines we have suggested, similar to those used to guide voting and
engagement decisions.331 Authority to generate litigation consistent with the guidelines could then
rest with portfolio managers (or a committee composed of portfolio managers and members of the
stewardship team), subject to approval from the mutual fund’s board of directors, who would
certify that the litigation addresses a serious issue of corporate governance, is likely to secure
compensation for investors, and/or is likely to defeat a transaction adverse to investors. Ultimately,
we believe the individuals controlling litigation should have input from the fiduciaries who control
the investment decisions for the funds’ investors, rather than displacing that decision by
individuals who are not fiduciaries (as mostly occurs now). And although these adjustments may
somewhat increase costs for the mutual fund complex, these costs would likely be offset by
successful claims.332
Alternatively, funds could outsource the litigation function to a portfolio monitor—a law
firm—that would track litigation and potential litigation across the portfolio, recommending cases
in which the fund might participate as a plaintiff or intervene as an objector. For example, three out
of the four shareholder suits that we discuss in Section III—Countrywide, American Realty, and
Valeant—involved the plaintiffs’ firm Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP. 333 Mutual
funds could continue to develop relationships with repeat-play firms, communicating their
guidelines in advance, and ensuring that portfolio managers, as well as the board of directors, keep
a careful eye on litigation agency costs over the life of the relationship.

331

Nearly every mutual fund family promulgates voting guidelines and follows them closely; see B IOY ET AL., supra
note 8, at 11. By contrast, none have adopted any policies with regard to shareholder litigation.
332
As an example, Vanguard’s successful settlement of the American Realty litigation netted it $90 million. See supra
Section III.A.4. A single settlement of this size each year would fund the hiring of several new litigation
employees—and then some.
333
See Current Cases, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN LLP, https://www.blbglaw.com/cases (last
visited July 3, 2019).
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We leave the internal business dynamics to the funds themselves, noting only that
implementing the mission statement need not be unduly burdensome or costly. But this, of
course, raises another question. If stewardship litigation is not burdensome or costly, why do
funds not do it already? And given that they do not, what other barriers remain in the way?
This brings us back to the problem of agency costs, in particular Corporate Client Conflict.
Insofar as mutual funds fear that participating in shareholder litigation would lead to a loss of
corporate revenue, we should not expect them to do so in the absence of pressure from their
investors or some other source. The Mission Statement gives investors a clear sense of what to
ask for. Given the potential interference of Corporate Client Conflict, mutual fund investors
could insist on internal separation—a “fire wall”—between litigation decisions and the sales and
marketing apparatus. Alternatively, investors could demand that stewardship groups refer certain
litigation decisions to an outside decision-maker independent of the incentives of the sales and
marketing department. If mutual funds fail to redesign their approach to litigation, their investors
might be able to bring fiduciary duty litigation against them. Recall that T. Rowe Price paid its
investors $200 million to avoid investor lawsuits when it accidentally forfeited their appraisal
rights.334 Mutual funds have also faced litigation for failing to collect settlement proceeds in
shareholder class actions.335 Therefore, investor suits might also be possible when mutual funds
fail to exercise shareholders’ litigation rights. For example, BlackRock is a Petrobras investor. 336
Yet BlackRock did not bring a direct suit against Petrobras, even though Vanguard did. 337 While
we would not want to see investor litigation against mutual funds for failure to bring every
claim—a safe-harbor deferring to the decision of a properly constituted, independent litigation
committee strikes us as appropriate—some form of investor pressure seems necessary, given the
potential of Corporate Client Conflict to influence mutual fund decision-making.
The collective action problem raises a second substantial obstacle to mutual fund
participation in shareholder suits. Many of the benefits we described above in producing
deterrence, enhancing governance, and reducing litigation agency costs redound to the market as a
whole.338 Insofar as funds measure their performance relative to that of their rivals, they may
have little incentive to expend resources to produce benefits in which their rivals will share.
A partial answer to the collective action problem is that mutual fund involvement in
shareholder litigation need not cost much. Attorneys’ fees can be contingency-based.
Moreover, in a given year, there are likely to be many fewer plausible shareholder claims, at least
in comparison to the tens of thousands of elections and proposals in which stewardship groups
currently participate. 339 The cost of screening litigation can be minimized by promulgating
guidelines ex ante, as well as by designating outside counsel as portfolio monitors to do much of
the work in discovering potential violations and framing the case.
334

See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
336
PBR/Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras ADR - Institutional Ownership and Shareholders, FINTEL,,
https://fintel.io/so/us/pbr (last updated July 3, 2019, 12:59 PM).
337
See supra Section III.A.4.
338
Note, however, that collective action incentives do not inhibit funds from seeking compensation in non-class suits.
See supra Section IV.D.2.
339
There are roughly 400 securities class actions filed in a single year. See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying
text. Compare this number to the 500+ shareholder proposals, and the tens of thousands of management elections and
other proposals on which mutual funds must vote annually. See Lund, supra note 14.
335
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But containing the cost of becoming involved in litigation is only a partial solution. If
mutual funds do not see the benefit, due to collective action problems, they are unlikely to become
involved however low the costs. It is important to emphasize, however, that the collective action
problem afflicts fund families, not individual funds. Investors put their savings with individual
funds, which owe fiduciary duties to their investors, not to the institution. It is therefore a
potential breach of fiduciary duty for mutual funds to fail to litigate on their investors’ behalf due
to collective action conflicts at the institution level. Overcoming the collective action problem,
like the corporate client conflict, may thus require that investors bring fiduciary duty claims
against funds that fail to litigate on their behalf. And here again, lest such claims overwhelm
mutual funds, we recommend a clear safe-harbor, based on the insights of the mission statement,
and implemented by a properly constituted, independent litigation committee.
Our hope is that these changes can be implemented through pressure brought to bear by
mutual fund investors—a category that includes institutions, as well as individuals—once they
know what to ask for. Investors should insist upon a source of authority within the fund family
that makes litigation decisions independent of the institution’s own incentives, based upon the
considerations outlined in the mission statement. Funds that implement such a structure in good
faith should receive deference in any subsequent fiduciary duty claims relating to the choices they
make in bringing (or not bringing) shareholder suits. Funds that fail to implement such a structure
should not receive such deference and thus remain vulnerable to investor fiduciary duty claims.
Although these changes can be implemented through private ordering, we observe that the failure
to implement such structures may also render the industry subject to greater risk of regulation.
Implementing the mission statement would allow mutual funds to avoid these consequences by
demonstrating that they are in fact using all available levers of corporate governance in the best
interests of their investors.
V.

Conclusion

More than half of U.S. households invest their retirement savings in mutual funds, and
mutual funds have become one of the most significant players in corporate governance. Scholars
have started to identify significant limitations in the way that mutual funds engage in corporate
governance, but the principal focus of this literature to date has been on how mutual funds vote.
We focus instead on how they sue.
Our empirical study of the largest mutual funds’ conduct in shareholder litigation leaves
little doubt that mutual funds are not using litigation as a tool to create value for investors. Mutual
funds’ abysmal litigation record sheds light on the broader debate over mutual funds’ stewardship
incentives. To the extent that mutual funds take governance seriously, as some, including the
funds themselves, claim they do, they must reform their approach to shareholder litigation.
This article shows them how. It articulates a mission statement for mutual funds in
shareholder litigation that would prioritize the interests of mutual fund investors. Our mission
statement embraces the market investor perspective on shareholder litigation and, we argue, could
be implemented through minor reforms to existing stewardship programs. Indeed, the principal
change is for funds to see shareholder litigation for what it is: a pillar of corporate governance that
can create real value for investors.
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